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I. INTRODUCTION
The FCC has recently issued a new set of Internet access regulations
1
and policies: the Open Internet Proceeding Report and Order. This order
culminates over a decade of intense policy debate on whether any rules,
and, if so, which rules will work best to structure the Internet’s component
markets. Advocates of regulation frame it as an effort to preserve “net
2
neutrality.” They fear dominant broadband providers, such as AT&T and
Comcast, will use their market power in consumer markets unfairly,
3
favoring Internet content in which they have financial interest. They argue
that the FCC should introduce strong regulation to defend the Internet—a
place that teems with decentralized creativity—from the centralizing
4
strictures of a glorified content delivery system. Foes of Internet
1. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, Report and Order, 25
F.C.C.R. 17905 (2010) [hereinafter Open Internet Proceeding Report and Order].
2. See, e.g., Robert Friedan, Summary of FCC’s Net Neutrality Report and Order,
TELEFRIEDAN,
http://telefrieden.blogspot.com/2011/01/summary-of-fccs-net-neutralityreport.html (“Broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful
network traffic while mobile carriers face a general no blocking rule that guarantees end
users’ access to the web and protects against mobile broadband providers’ blocking
applications that compete with their other primary service offering—voice and video
telephony. The Report and Order rejects assertions that network neutrality requirements
would stifle innovation reduce incentives to invest in network infrastructure.”).
3. Josh Halliday, Al Franken Warns of ‘Outright Disaster’ Over Net Neutrality,
PAIDCONTENT (Mar. 14, 2011), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-al-franken-warns-ofoutright-disaster-over-net-neutrality/ (“Net neutrality advocates fear that internet providers,
most pertinently Comcast which controls a large stake in both TV and internet provision,
could downgrade rivals’ content and boost delivery of their own.”).
4. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 34–35 (2001); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley,
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 294 (2007) (emphasizing the decentralized nature of
the Internet); Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality or Bias?−Handicapping the Odds for a
Tiered and Branded Internet, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171, 174–75 (2007);
Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the
Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815 (2004); Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User’s
Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, 95 (2004); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003); Kevin
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regulation fear that openness mandates might create burdensome
5
government intrusion and reduce infrastructure investment. They fear that
the FCC’s fitful fantasy of slaying anticompetitive dragons will impose
new government controls that smother the real and innovative wonder of a
6
free Internet.
The Open Internet Proceeding focuses on one issue: “last mile”
7
anticompetitive foreclosure. Broadband access providers, like AT&T,
Comcast, or Verizon, might favor affiliated online content and disfavor
competitors. For example, Verizon might block access to Skype, a
competitor in telephony; Comcast might block or degrade online video
downloads from Netflix, a competitor in cable television services; or any of
them might accept money from Google to degrade Yahoo’s traffic.
The FCC Open Internet Order employs the normative principle of
8
“reasonable discrimination” as the legal standard for Internet regulation,
9
following the FCC’s analysis in the NPRM. Applying this principle to
Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 67
(2002); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 970 (2001);
Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562 (2000).
5. Commissioner Robert McDowell, Hands off the Internet, WASH. POST, April 9,
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/04/08/AR2010040803
375.html (“Nonetheless, the FCC may still consider imposing early-20th-century vintage
“common carrier” regulations on 21st-century broadband technologies. One result of the
new rules could be to make it harder for the operators of broadband “pipes” to build “smart”
networks, which offer connectivity and other services or products.”).
6. Daniel L. Brenner, Creating Effective Broadband Network Regulation, 62 FED.
COMM. L.J. 13, 76 (2010) (“This Article has focused on that regulator-the FCC. It appears
limited in its ability to function as the creator or wise arbiter of ex ante rules, measured by
what it is, its resources, and its record of success and failure in guiding and governing
communications networks.”); C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise
of Zero-Price Regulation, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 135, 152 (2008); Gerald R. Faulhaber,
Network Neutrality: The Debate Evolves, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 680, 680–82 (2007); J. Gregory
Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 349, 356 (2006) (“Ex ante regulation in the name of network
neutrality would be a costly mistake that policy makers still have the ability to avoid.”);
Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J.
1847, 1907–08 (2006); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 12 (2005); see generally NET NEUTRALITY OR NET NEUTERING: SHOULD
BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES BE REGULATED? (Thomas M. Lenard & Randolph J. May
eds., 2006).
7. See, e.g., Barbara van Schewick & David Farber, Point/Counterpoint: Network
Neutrality Nuances, 52 COMM. ACM 31, 31–32 (2009).
8. Open Internet Proceeding Report and Order, supra note 1, at 17905–06.
9. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 13064, paras. 8, 103 (2009) [hereinafter Open Internet NPRM]
(“[B]roadband Internet access service providers may have both the incentive and the means
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how the network transmits packets of data, some phrase the rule as
requiring that “like content” gets “like treatment” without discriminating
based on the type of application or discriminating by the identity of the
10
sender or receiver. The Open Internet Order applies this principle to
11
broadband access providers.
This Article first shows that this regulatory approach and the
attendant scholarly debate are fatally narrow. With their noses buried in the
last mile, commentators and regulators do not account for the full range of
tactics available to a network when it wants to discriminate. Internet
networks—beginning with those networks adjacent to the last mile—enable
alternate modes of control over user traffic.
Beyond merely discriminating among packets of data upon entry into
the last mile (the exclusive concern of the FCC proposals), a broadband
provider can also discriminate among interconnecting networks. Comcast
or Verizon could thereby “outsource” the discrimination deeper into the
network by the terms and conditions under which it interconnects with
these other networks. Defending only the last mile will yield an open
doorway to a closed Internet.
Compounding this shortsightedness, the relevant vertical foreclosure
discussions have not been helpful. As the following discussion concerning
economic analysis shows, law professors fumble outside their expertise by
dressing up unsettled economic theory as if it were resolved and canonical.
Their efforts, however intriguing and provocative, have avoided carefully
examining the effectiveness of actual network regulations.
Second, we detail how the FCC, like academia, erroneously translates
normative standards of nondiscrimination and fairness into rules for
Internet engineering. These efforts fail because any network will carry
some traffic types better than others. Building and configuring a network to
to discriminate in favor of or against certain Internet traffic and to alter the operation of their
networks in ways that negatively affect consumers, as well as innovators trying to develop
Internet-based content, applications, and services . . . . [T]he ability of network operators to
discriminate in price or service quality among different types of traffic or different providers
or users may impose significant social costs . . . . The key issue we face is distinguishing
socially beneficial discrimination from socially harmful discrimination in a workable
manner.”).
10. Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. POST,
June 8, 2006, at A23; Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, supra note 4, at 167–
68 (“In technical terms, this means discrimination based on IP addresses, domain name,
cookie information, TCP port, and others as we will describe in greater detail below.”).
11. The proposal carves out an exception for “managed services.” Open Internet
NPRM, supra note 9, at para. 149 (“[T]hese managed or specialized services may differ
from broadband Internet access services in ways that recommend a different policy
approach, and it may be inappropriate to apply the rules proposed here to managed or
specialized services.”). It remains to be seen if this is an exception that swallows the rule.
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route packets will necessarily discriminate. An almost unconscious
importing of earlier telephone or telegraph regulation into the Internet
policy debate accounts in part for the mistake of blanket opposition to
12
discrimination.
As a regulatory concept, discrimination made sense with the old,
telephone circuit-switched network, which involved distinct and exclusive
connections, i.e., circuits, over which people communicated. At switch
points, circuits could be mandated for equal treatment because a circuit was
a real and singular item. Previous “open network” regulation—such as the
Modified Final Judgment’s mandated equal access for competitive long
distance companies or the local competition under the 1996
Telecommunications Act (“the 1996 Act”)—required quite simply that
networks create places at which competitors could place their wires in an
13
equal manner. Discrimination, therefore, had a clear and distinct meaning
in the old telephone network.
In packet-switched networks, like the Internet, the circuits are virtual.
Legal scholars have yet to comprehend how the virtualizing of the circuit
14
has shattered the possibility of coherent nondiscrimination regulation.
The crucial and difficult inquiry begins with an effort to distinguish “good”
from “bad” discrimination. But any regulation must realize that no single
rule can properly distinguish in a general way. Rather, the distinctions must
be contextual to the consumers’ experiences, markets, and social
environments.
Third, we suggest a more productive framing for defending the open
Internet. The inevitability of discrimination need not paralyze policy—it
merely urges a different conception of the task. To defend an open Internet
does not require (to borrow the phrase from employment law) “equal, nondiscriminatory treatment” of bits or traffic as the FCC and many scholars
12. See infra Section II for a discussion of the translation of normative-legal concepts
of discrimination that work (or do not work) in a circuit and packet-switched network.
13. See CHARLES H. KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
46 (2d ed. 2001).
14. The failure to recognize that Internet networks by their nature discriminate is
endemic to the legal scholarship. Nonetheless, there have been some who recognize the
difficulties. See Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1279 (2007)
(“The second element of the mainstream network neutrality argument is a claim that a nondiscrimination rule can effectively address the innovation-killing behavior of network
operators. Yet that assumes government can craft and enforce a rule that distinguishes
benign from anti-competitive discrimination, which is more difficult than it might seem.”).
See also Tim Wu & Christopher Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 577 (2007) (“[N]o one really believes in
systems that ban discrimination completely . . . . [T]he network neutrality debate—the
useful part of it—is getting a better grip on what amounts to good and bad forms of
discrimination on information networks.” (statement of Tim Wu)).
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15

propose. Instead, it requires “equality of outcomes,” i.e., equality of
16
Internet experience, for user applications. Whether it is Voice over
Internet Protocol (“VoIP”), video, web browsing, or whatever might come
next, the public cares about what it can do, not the component parts of how
whatever it does gets done. The obsession with packet-wise equality, i.e., a
complete lack of network discrimination, is aimless. Packet-wise equality
may prevent some of the worst abuses of a hostile network, but the
treatment of a given packet relates only indirectly to human concern. The
immediate concern is what the transmitted packets combine to accomplish
17
in actual online experience. Contrary to the assumptions in the debate,
there is no necessary relationship between packet-wise equality and online
experience of Internet applications.
Determining equality of outcomes is highly contextual. It often
involves issues that have little to do with traffic treatment, as we discuss in
Section IV. Where others begin with vague principles, we begin with facts.
We look at the prominent Internet controversies of the last decade. Our
analysis shows that discriminatory treatment, as such, was not the
animating concern. For instance, when Comcast inserted a packet into the
TCP stream to spoof the closing of a peer-to-peer connection, this was not
18
about discrimination. We argue it was an issue of privacy and the
expectation of message integrity—not a concern over discriminatory
19
treatment.
Finally, we address the primary legal question on appeal of the Open
Internet Order, which is whether the FCC has jurisdiction to impose any
sort of regulation on the Internet. We argue that conventional wisdom
misunderstands the impact of the 1996 Act on FCC’s jurisdiction. We
15. Joel Wm. Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action
Under Title VII: The Access Principle, 65 TEX. L. REV. 41, 43 (1986) (“Traditionally,
equality in the employment context has been perceived as requiring either equal treatment
of, or equal achievement by, minority and nonminority applicants and employees; the
former is achieved by procedural symmetry in the methods of selection and treatment of all
employees and the latter by outcome proportionality in the number of applicants and
employees of different groups who receive jobs or advancement on the job.”).
16. We are indebted to the work of Jerry Kang who first suggested analyzing Internet
discrimination under a more fluid conceptual framework. See Jerry Kang, Race.Net
Neutrality, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 4 (2007) (“What lessons can be drawn from
a comparison between discrimination in both domains, race and net? First, we immediately
notice how the definition of discrimination is sharply contested.”).
17. See supra notes 4–6.
18. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, para. 30 (2008) [hereinafter BitTorrent Order]; Comcast Corp. v.
FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
19. See infra Section IV.
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argue that the Act did not disrupt the existing structure of FCC regulations
set forth in the Computer Inquiries and the original 1934 Communications
20
Act: the FCC regulates basic communications service while deregulating
more advanced services that can be provided through the telephone
21
22
network, such as FAX or internet access. The 1996 Act’s technical, and
23
as we shall see, nonsensical definitions—“telecommunications,”
24
25
telecommunications service,”
and “information service” —did not
change this structure. Indeed, the authors of the 1996 Act would never have
foreseen or desired such a result. Thus, the FCC has jurisdiction to
promulgate the Open Internet Order pursuant to its authority to ensure
basic communications pursuant to a regulatory structure that Congress
never intended to change.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Section II, we explore the
concepts of “discrimination” and “fairness” through the lens of network
engineering to properly understand how networks discriminate. In Section
III, we catalog recent Internet controversies to begin growing the body of
“Internet case law” and to show that nondiscrimination concerns only
motivate a part, perhaps a small part, of Internet controversies. Section IV
sets forth the components of a regulatory regime that responds in a bottomup manner to the complexity of Internet concerns. Finally, Section V
provides an analysis of the FCC’s jurisdictional authority to impose such a
regime.

II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS DOES NOT PROVIDE POLICY
GUIDANCE
The network openness debates have swirled around two economic
questions. The first question is whether the last mile access provider—the
ISP, such as Comcast or Verizon—can or will block (or degrade) access to
26
unaffiliated content providers (i.e., “vertical foreclosure”). In other
20. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
scattered sections 47 U.S.C.).
21. Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 21531, para. 1 (1998).
22. See Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15982 (1997).
23. 47 U.S.C. § 153(50).
24. Id. § 153(53).
25. Id. § 153(24).
26. Compare Faulhaber, supra note 6, at 691 (“Perhaps the most vexing issues
surrounding net neutrality involve potential abuses by broadband ISPs of their power to
foreclose or otherwise exploit vertical markets . . . . [I]n order to reach their broadband
customers, application providers must use the services of broadband ISPs; typically,
customers have a choice of at most two such broadband providers: their local cable
company (cable modem) or their local telephone company (DSL).”), and Sidak, supra note
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words, might Comcast block access to Hulu because it competes to provide
video services? Broadband providers, who have significant market power,
control the “bottleneck.” With this point of control, the broadband
providers can discriminate among content kind and source to consumers’
27
detriments.
Conceiving of market power in broadband services in this way
ignores how broadband providers connect with other networks. As we
discuss in detail below, when an access network discriminates, it hurts the
adjacent network, which now provides incrementally weaker connectivity
to all ends within the access provider network. It is not clear that adjacent
networks (transit and peering networks) would permit the access provider
to do this, because such discrimination undermines the service that the
adjacent networks are providing to networks on the other side, i.e., the
28
adjacent network’s sell “reachability.”
When an access provider
discriminates, it reduces this valuable characteristic of the adjacent
network. Since it is not clear that an access provider would always be able
to dictate such terms to adjacent networks, a bottleneck model is likely not
universally accurate.
But even assuming that the vertical foreclosure model is applied,
attempts to regulate will fail if they only forbid the access provider from
discriminating. An access provider, like Comcast, can effectively
discriminate without actually performing the packet discrimination in its
network.
An access provider can “outsource” discrimination by adopting
discriminatory terms in peering and transit contracts with other network
providers. The literature on Internet openness, for the most part, ignores
29
this possibility. While its order concentrated on vertical foreclosure, the
6, at 351 (“Network neutrality regulation would constrain the behavior of a downstream
broadband Internet access provider vis-à-vis its users and upstream providers of Internet
content and applications.”), with Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework
for Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 390 (2007) (“In
the absence of network neutrality regulation, there is a real threat that network providers
will discriminate against independent producers of applications, content or portals or
exclude them from their network. This threat reduces the amount of innovation in the
markets for applications, content and portals at significant costs to society.”).
27. See van Schewick, supra note 26, at 390.
28. Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Internet Backbone, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 376–77 (2005) (“[A]n ISP needs to interconnect with
other ISPs so that its customers will reach all computers/nodes on the Internet. That is,
interconnection is necessary to provide universal connectivity on the Internet, which is
demanded by users.”).
29. We have found one notable exception. See Christopher T. Marsden, Net Neutrality:
The European Debate, 12 J. INTERNET L. 2, 7 (2008) (“[S]uch discrimination may possibly
be detected by the end-user when it is conducted by its ISP, while a far more pernicious and
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FCC does hint at the problem and suggest the possibility of a regulatory
30
response.
Setting aside these alternate discriminatory tactics and looking simply
at whether the access provider vertically forecloses competitors, the
scholarship has been unhelpful. The debate has assumed an arid nature.
Economists experiment with theories built on myriad assumptions and
caveats that render them too immature to guide policy. Law professors play
economists by arguing for or against these theories, but, as we will show,
they reach their conclusions by relying on intuitive, imprecise judgments
about the costs and benefits of Internet regulation versus laissez faire.
The second economic question is whether Internet openness will
increase or decrease investment and innovation (“dynamic efficiency”).
31
From Mark Lemley and Larry Lessig’s article on end-to-end architecture
32
to Yochai Benkler’s Wealth of Networks, much ink has been spilled over
whether the Internet’s architecture provides an altogether special type of
33
innovation that must be protected. In the other corner, laissez faire
defenders argue that enforcing any type of Internet design will lead to
34
decreased investment both in infrastructure and content.

potentially undetectable discrimination may occur at peering points.”); see also id. at 7 n.13
(“The debate in regard to the subtleties of service degradation is beyond this article, and
experts at the Paris conference of 29 May 2007 were divided as to whether degradation that
is deliberate could be well enough disguised to suggest off-net discrimination.”).
30. Open Internet NPRM, supra note 9, at paras. 104–10.
31. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 4.
32. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
33. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 34–35; Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of
Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359, 392 (2007) (“[O]nline diversity stems from
allowing the end-to-end, content-neutral, layer-independent functions of the Internet to
flourish . . . .”); Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the
Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J.
383, 398 (2007) (“The Internet is currently a mixed infrastructure that supports the
production of a wide variety of private, public, and nonmarket goods—many of which yield
socially valuable spillovers . . . . [T]he Internet is a general purpose, enabling platform for
users. Common nondiscriminatory access to this platform facilitates widespread end-user
participation in a variety of socially valuable productive activities.”).
34. J. Gregory Sidak, Innovation, Spillovers and the “Dirt Road” Fallacy: The
Intellectual Bankruptcy of Banning Optional Transactions for Enhanced Delivery Over the
Internet, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 521, 525 (2010) (“The FCC's October 2009 notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on network neutrality only partially chronicles the robust
body of literature that criticizes proposals for network neutrality regulation with respect to
its effect on investment and innovation.”); see also Joelle Tessler, House Republicans Move
to Block FCC Internet Regulations, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2011, 12:07 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/18/house-republicans-block-net-neutrality_n_
824917.html.
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These investment and innovation arguments dazzle and ask deep
questions, but they are inconclusive as guides for regulation. The Internet
architecture may very well be unique in human history and may transform
economic innovation and human communications. However, recognizing
its uniqueness does not provide real insight into what types of
discrimination are acceptable nor provide guidance as to which network
configurations the FCC should prohibit and which it should not. On the
other side, limits on how broadband service providers discriminate may
indeed decrease profits under certain scenarios. But a hypothetical drop in
profitability is both speculative and possibly justified if it achieves some
other end. Laissez faire advocates do not know.

A.

Is Vertical Foreclosure the Right Lens for Network Openness?

As mentioned above, the FCC follows most scholarly and policy
analysis in viewing the problem as vertical foreclosure, in which the
unregulated broadband service provider could exercise control over traffic
to the end user. Reflecting the conventional assumptions, the FCC’s NPRM
35
includes the following drawing:

This picture illustrates the broadband provider exercising a bottleneck
control over content, blocking unaffiliated content in favor of its own.
AT&T and several other commentators (including this Article’s
authors) observed in their comments in the Open Internet Proceeding that
36
this picture does not portray Internet markets. A more realistic picture
looks like this:

35. Open Internet NPRM, supra note 9, at 13105 Diagram 2.
36. See Open Internet Proceeding Report and Order, supra note 1, at 3–10; Comments
of MSU College of Law IP & Comm. Law Program at 3, Preserving the Open Internet
Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52 (rel. Jan. 14, 2010); Comments of
AT&T at 55–58, Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket
No. 07-52 (rel. Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Comments of AT&T].
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For decades, the basic structure of the Internet has been changing, and
retail broadband provider services, like Comcast or AT&T, are only one
part. They connect through peering and transit agreements to backbone
37
providers, which connect the various Internet networks. The FCC, the
Government Accounting Office, and the Federal Trade Commission
38
recognize this structure in their publications.
While the general outline of the Internet interconnection market is
well known, very little is publicly known about the contractual bases—or
market power—under which traffic is exchanged in the Internet. Backbone
39
providers are classified by size (Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3). By
conventional wisdom, Tier 1 backbones exchange traffic for free (“peer”)
40
but require smaller backbones to “transit” for a fee. However, it is
difficult to determine at any one time who is, in fact, a Tier 1 provider. The
lack of knowledge about the market upon which the entire information
economy depends is almost comical. For instance, an FTC report on
Internet competition produced two years ago contains a discussion of
interconnection markets that relies almost exclusively on an FCC research
paper published in the late 1990s, which states explicitly that it lacks any
41
rigorous information about interconnection markets.
37. Peyman Faratin et al., The Growing Complexity of Internet Interconnection, 72
COMM. & STRATEGIES 51, 55–56 (2008).
38. See generally Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet
Backbones (FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 32, 2000),
http://morse.colorado.edu/~epperson/courses/routing-protocols/handouts/oppwp32.pdf;
FTC, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 25–26 (2007); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-16, CHARACTERISTICS AND COMPETITIVENESS OF THE
INTERNET BACKBONE MARKET (2001).
39. Economides, supra note 28.
40. Id.
41. FTC, supra note 38, at 25–26. While everyone recognizes the basic structure of
Internet connection, not much is known, at least publicly, about interconnection markets.
Agencies charged with regulating them do not seem interested in finding out. Ten years ago
the FCC looked deeply into the interconnection markets and found no answers: “The
analysis contained in this Article is based solely on publicly available information. As in
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Further, beyond the general outline of the Internet interconnection
market, there are many features that stymie a simple analysis. For instance,
content delivery networks (“CDNs”), which are localized Internet
42
presences, guarantee an improved level of content for their clients.
43
Similarly, large content providers own extensive network infrastructure.
44
This all shows that a simple foreclosure story is reductive. Market
power, to the degree that it exists in the Internet, expresses itself in far
more complex ways, and the FCC’s primary proposed remedy, which only
looks at the last mile, is woefully inadequate. Broadband providers could
evade regulation by outsourcing discrimination further inside the network
in its peering and transit agreements. Outsourcing discrimination is already
45
an issue.
More broadly, the economic analyses that are forwarded in this
debate, discussed in detail below, assume vertical foreclosure. They miss

most markets, information about Internet backbone prices and costs is proprietary. In
addition, information about the nature of relationships between Internet backbone providers
is protected by non-disclosure agreements.” Kende, supra note 38, at 13 n.51. A year later,
the GAO reported similar ignorance: “In the absence of adequate information, it is difficult
to fully ascertain . . . the extent of market concentration and competition in the Internet
backbone market.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 38, at 28. Ten years
later, the FTC examined the issue and simply relied almost exclusively on the ten-years-old
FCC working paper. See FTC, supra note 38, at 25–26. Private efforts have also failed to
improve the quality and quantity of interconnection data has remained rudimentary. See
Dmitri Krioukov et al., The Workshop on Internet Topology (WIT) Report, 37 ACM
SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV. 69 (2007), http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/
2007/wit/wit.pdf (“In its current state, Internet topology research is not an informed
discipline since available data is not only scarce, but also severely limited by technical,
legal, and social constraints on its collection and distribution.”). For a general discussion of
the problem of network disclosure, see Adam Candeub & Daniel John McCartney, Network
Transparency: Seeing the Neutral Network, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228 (2010).
42. Only Connect, supra note 14, at 1233 (“CDNs such as Akamai operate distributed
networks of caching servers, hosted on large numbers of networks, which automatically
serve content to end users from nearby caches.”).
43. See, e.g., World Wide Wait: The Faster the Internet Becomes, the Slower it Loads
Pages, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.economist.com/science-technology/
displaystory.cfm?story_id=15523761 (“Google said this week that it was not going to hang
around waiting for the telecoms industry to build the new optical web. The company is
planning a low-latency fibre network that will be capable of delivering speeds of over 100
megabytes a second for communities of 50,000–500,000 people.”).
44. We have called for a more accurate understanding of interconnection markets for a
long time. See Adam Candeub & Daniel McCartney, Network Neutrality & Network
Transparency, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228 (2010).
45. See, e.g., George Ou, FCC NPRM Ban on Paid Peering Harms New Innovators,
DIGITAL SOCIETY (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.digitalsociety.org/2009/11/fcc-nprm-ban-onpaid-peering-harms-new-innovators/ (discussing discrimination in peering and transit
relationships).
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the possibility that market power could be exercised in different ways, i.e.,
abusive peering policies or interconnection contracts.

B.

Is Foreclosure a Reasonable Concern?

Regardless of whether vertical foreclosure stories rely upon an
accurate view of the Internet interconnection market, assume, along with
much legal and economic scholarship, that the Internet openness debate is
all about foreclosure. The question is whether a broadband provider would,
in fact, exclude or degrade content that competed with its own. In other
words, would Comcast block Hulu or would AT&T block its competitor’s
VoIP phone service? This question of economic theory does not have a
clear answer emerging.
For the novice, the question boils down to whether a broadband
provider could get more money from selling broadband when (1) affiliated
content is favored and other content is blocked, leading to a less desirable
service, or (2) content is treated the same, leading to less revenue from
affiliated content but a more desirable service that would reach a broader
market.
Some assume it would be obvious that broadband providers would
foreclose. Much legal scholarship as well as policy and popular discussion
simply assume this to be the case while others find foreclosure merely
hypothetical.46 While this concern motivates much of the debate, it may not
be justified, but economic theory cannot tell for sure. Two approaches have
dominated economists’ approaches to answering this question: (1) the
single monopoly rent theorem and (2) the two-sided markets. Neither
comes close to helping either side declare victory.

46. Compare Crawford, supra note 33, at 397 (“Network providers have ample reasons
to discriminate in this way in favor of their own applications.”), with James B. Speta,
Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband
Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 84 (2000) (In broadband markets “even a monopolist will
have the incentive to encourage a wide variety of information services in order to increase
subscribership.”); see Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, supra note 6, at
1888 (maintaining that broadband service providers have an incentive to interconnect with
complementary innovation to make their networks more profitable); Nicholas Economides,
“Net Neutrality,” Non-Discrimination and Digital Distribution of Content Through the
Internet, 4 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 209, 232 (2008) (“The present question . . . is
whether to allow the Internet to be run without non-discrimination rules or whether to
impose specific non-discrimination rules. A number of considerations favor imposing a
specific rule supporting ‘net neutrality.’”); Faulhaber, supra note 6, at 697 (“[T]he problems
are all potential problems, not actual problems.”).
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1. The Single Monopoly Rent Theorem, Vertical Integration
Stories, and Broadband
The single monopoly rent theorem addresses the question of whether
a monopolist, such as Comcast or AT&T, would have the incentive to
leverage its market power from broadband provision into content by
blocking nonaffiliated content providers. In other words, would AT&T, if it
had a dominant position in retail broadband, have the incentive to block
VoIP?
Under the single monopoly rent theorem, the answer may be no.
Assume that on average individuals will pay up to fifty dollars per month
for broadband. Assume further that they would pay sixty dollars if they had
access to VoIP service. AT&T can simply charge consumers sixty dollars
for broadband service and extract any economic rents the VoIP provider
could extract. In other words, if you are the monopolist, you have the
incentive to provide as diverse an offering as possible in order to extract
47
additional revenue.
Mirroring the certainty of the “vertical foreclosure will always
happen” crowd, many believe that the single monopoly rent theorem
“proves” that foreclosure will never occur. Of course, even those who
know nothing about economics would suspect that these matters do not
have clear answers. The following examines arguments that apply the
single monopoly rent theorem to the Internet. The theory is inconclusive,
but, perhaps more important, the connection between economic theory and
reality is less than tenuous; it is systematically disconnected.
The single monopoly rent theorem relies on numerous assumptions as
48
Professor Einer Elhauge recently has shown. It is unclear whether or not
many of the assumptions he identifies can be satisfied in broadband service
markets. Consider the following:

47. Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 6, at 16; see also Daniel F. Spulber &
Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of
Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1836–37 (2007) (“At the same time, economic theorists
have questioned the input monopolist’s incentive to engage in vertical exclusion. The
driving force behind this critique is the so-called ‘one monopoly rent theorem,’ which holds
that there is only one monopoly profit to be gained in any vertical chain of production. As a
result, the input monopolist can capture all of the available profit without vertically
integrating into another level of production simply by selling the input to all comers at the
monopoly price.”).
48. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009).
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1. There is a monopoly output supplier whose monopoly is protected
by prohibitive barriers to entry, and there is perfect competition in
49
the upstream input market;
2. The monopoly is unregulated;
3. The technology for producing output involves usage of all inputs in
50
fixed proportions;
4. Strong positive demand correlation;
5. Fixed usage of the tying product;
6. Fixed tied market competitiveness; and
51
7. Fixed tying market competitiveness.
The application of these assumptions to the Internet broadband provision
markets is quite fraught. Consider a monopoly input supplier: the amount
of monopoly power which broadband operators have is greatly contested.
Some see competition everywhere, from satellite, WiFi, wireless, cable,
52
and DSL. Others see at best a duopoly of cable and telephone/DSL.
While, in fact, few consumers enjoy more than two providers of residential
broadband (cable and phone service), it is not clear how other modes of
delivery currently affect these providers’ market power. Equally important,
it is unclear how emerging technologies will affect their market power.
Nonetheless, for the single monopoly rent theorem to apply, one must have
a factual basis to determine broadband service providers’ market power.
While all agree that the broadband provision is (effectively)
53
unregulated, the third assumption has received little attention in the
49. Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A PostChicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 517–18. The single monopoly rent theorem is
classically formulated as a monopolist in the input and competitive downstream markets. It
works in situations in which there is a downstream monopolist and input of competitive
markets. See Michael H. Riordan, Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration 1, 9 n.6
(Colum.
Univ.
Dep’t
Econ.,
Discussion
Paper
No.
0506-11,
2005),
http://www.columbia.edu/~mhr21/Vertical-Integration-Nov-11-2005.pdf.
50. Riordan & Salop, supra note 49, at 517–18.
51. Elhauge, supra note 48; see also van Schewick, supra note 26.
52. Compare Faulhaber, supra note 6, at 691, and Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free
Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 431 (2009) (“And because we live in
what is effectively a cable-phone duopoly for broadband services, market competition
would not necessarily counteract this censorship.”), with Marius Schwartz, Professor of
Economics, Georgetown University, Statement at National Broadband Plan Workshop:
Economic
Issues
in
Broadband
Competition
46–47
(2009),
http://www.broadband.gov/docs/ws_28_economic.pdf (identifying five or six broadband
providers that most consumers can access and noting indicators of competition among
them).
53. This assertion is a bit of a simplification. Broadband service regulation is currently
subject to regulation pursuant to Title I of the 1934 Communications Act, but cable systems,
over which cable modems run, are subject to state or local franchising regulations or both.
However, this control is very limited.
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Internet context, but its application is quite uncertain. Professor Einar
Elhauge provides an example of this exception. Consider a monopolist of
computer printers. Would such a firm have the incentive to monopolize the
printer ink market? At first blush, the single monopoly rent theorem would
conclude that there exists one rent in computer printing and, therefore, no
incentive to leverage. However, some of the printer manufacturer’s
customers use a lot of printing, and some use less. By charging more for
ink cartridges to the high volume users, the monopolist can extract extra
profits and expand its monopoly. In other words, tying (i.e., selling printers
bundled with ink cartridges) could help a monopolist price discriminate
54
more effectively.
It is not clear whether this exception applies to the Internet. Certainly
Internet users use different services on the Internet (VoIP, browsers, file
sharing, and so on) in different proportions. A broadband provider with
affiliated interest in one of these services, such as a cable company
providing voice telephony, could charge differing rates to high volume
users. There is no empirical evidence one way or the other. Indeed, to have
some basis for claiming application or nonapplication, a regulator would
have to collect evidence of its broadband service pricing schemes. The
regulator would have to discover evidence in discrimination—and whether
it was motivated in the manner described above. We are not aware of any
such data.
The fourth assumption is that a strong positive demand correlation
exists; on average, people’s demand for the monopoly good and the
leveraged good go up and down together. Again borrowing from Professor
Elhauge, suppose that a broadband provider has market power in both
broadband provision and broadband telephone service. There is a marginal
cost of zero dollars for providing both, which is not an inappropriate
assumption for broadband provision. There are one hundred buyers with
negatively correlated demand. Half of these buyers value broadband at one
hundred dollars, but telephone service at zero dollars. But their demand for
broadband service and telephone service are not correlated, so that a buyer
who values broadband at one hundred dollars could value broadband cable
at zero dollars, and vice versa. Either way, their combined demand always
55
equals one hundred dollars.
If the broadband provider could sell only broadband, it would price
the broadband at fifty dollars, thereby capturing 51 percent of the
customers, earning $2550. The broadband telephone service, say Vonage,
54. Elhauge, supra note 48, at 404–05; see also van Schewick, supra note 26, at 340
n.38.
55. Elhauge, supra note 48, at 406–07.
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would sell its service to fifty-one customers as well, also earning $2550. If
there were only one provider, say AT&T, it would sell both at one hundred
dollars. All one hundred customers would buy this package, earning AT&T
$10,000. Notice in the first case, people received the “surplus” of their
bargain. Although many paid fifty dollars, many valued their broadband
service at more than fifty dollars.
Once again, there is little or no empirical evidence on whether this
strategy is practicable or prevalent. This would involve an extensive survey
of broadband service providers’ pricing schemes and research on consumer
demand.
The fifth assumption also has questionable application to broadband
provision. A monopolist can use its market power to foreclose competition
56
and entry in the tied application market. In other words, a broadband
service provider could foreclose enough of the VoIP market to deter entry
into the VoIP market. Broadband telephone service requires significant
fixed capital investment. If the broadband service provider could foreclose
enough of the market to make it too small for a broadband telephone
provider to enter (i.e., fixed costs must be spread over the entire customer
base; therefore, if entry has a high fixed cost, there must also be a
sufficiently large customer base), then the broadband provider might
leverage itself into the telephone market. Similar arguments apply if entry
requires economies of scale.
In sum, theory cannot tell us whether the single monopoly rent
theorem applies to broadband service providers and Internet applications.
Advocates who argue as to whether it applies concede that its application is
uncertain, even though the likelihood of its application is central to any
regulatory response. If it is likely, a more costly regulatory response is
warranted.
Indeed, the comments in the FCC’s Open Internet Proceeding
demonstrate the inconclusiveness of these vertical foreclosure theories. For
instance, AT&T’s expert, Georgetown University economics professor
Marius Schwartz, submitted comments critiquing the work of Stanford Law
Professor Barbara van Schewick, who argues that the single monopoly rent
theorem may not apply to broadband platforms and upon whose work the
FCC Open Internet NPRM relied. Professor Schwartz states:
On the specific issue of anti-competitive discrimination, van
Schewick’s article offers a useful compilation of theories [of vertical
integration and the single monopoly rent theorem] that are quite
familiar to industrial organization economists. But she does not attempt
to establish their applicability, stating that there are circumstances in
56. Id. at 408–10; see also van Schewick, supra note 26, at 329–39.
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which incentives to engage in anti-competitive discrimination “may”
exist, but “[w]hether the conditions . . . are present in a real life
situation, is an empirical question.” But there are wide gaps between
57
the assumptions underlying the theories and the actual facts.

Well, what’s good for the goose is good for the gander. Professor
Schwartz is no doubt correct that there are wide gaps between theory and
reality, but that is true for both critics and advocates of the single monopoly
rent theorem. And AT&T, in its comments proper, advocates for the
58
theorem but fails to fill in these underlying assumptions. Professor
Schwartz could well critique his own client.
As is obvious from this Section, any Internet regulation that limits the
broadband service provider from discriminating might decrease its profits.
Less profit might result in lower incentives to invest. At the same time, less
discrimination allows users greater freedom in creating applications.
Network openness involves a trade-off between providing incentives for
infrastructure and application innovations.
Rather than attempt to discover whether the single monopoly rent
theorem applies to broadband provision—or to what extent or under what
circumstances it might apply—many in this policy debate simply engage in
a kind of ceteris paribus type of argument, trying to persuade the reader
how this trade-off between incentives should come out. In fact, one could
go so far as to claim that the differing views over this trade-off characterize
the entire legal scholarly debate. Legal academics have provided no data,
no industry analysis, and no theory both rich enough to capture the
industrial organization of the Internet and sufficiently powerful to produce
results useful to regulators in crafting nondiscrimination rules. Instead, they
either offer vague trade-offs in which the cost of regulation must be
59
balanced against the risk of anticompetitive behavior, provide vague
57. Declaration of Marius Schwartz for AT&T at 29, Preserving the Open Internet:
Broadband Industry Practices, FCC GN Docket 09-191, WC Docket 07-52 (rel. Jan. 14,
2010) [hereinafter Schwartz Jan. 2010 Comments] (citation omitted), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020377221.
58. See Comments of AT&T, supra note 36, at 120–21 (“Modern antitrust analysis
recognizes that, except in very specific contexts, even a monopolist in a platform market
generally has little incentive to act anticompetitively towards unaffiliated application
providers that wish to use its platform. In particular, a platform provider free from retail
price regulation—as all broadband providers are today—will normally have incentives to
deal evenhandedly with independent providers of [content].”).
59. Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law?: Anti-Discrimination Norms in
Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 45 (2006) (“While loudly
proclaimed, the salience of this argument against anti-discrimination rules is greatly
overstated. There is little question that market entry in any infrastructure market is likely to
be challenging. However, that is for reasons having little to do with anti-discrimination rules
and everything to do with recovering the considerable costs of infrastructure
deployments.”); see also Susan P. Crawford, Network Rules, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
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methods to weigh the cost of antidiscrimination rules, or warn of the risks
61
of regulation without forwarding metrics for measuring such risks.
Again, the comments to the Open Network NPRM make this point.
Professor Schwartz attacked Professor van Schewick for asserting that
antidiscrimination rules will be beneficial even when weighed against the
disincentives for investment:
Accepting that intervention could reduce investment and innovation by
network providers, van Schewick nevertheless contends that increasing
application-level innovation is more important . . . , but, again, with no
empirical foundation. Finally, she acknowledges that regulatory costs
associated with intervention “are not covered in detail” . . . , but
disturbingly seems to assume away such costs by contending that
regulation aimed at anticompetitive discrimination will not condemn
good conduct nor discourage investment. This is a strikingly optimistic
62
view of the efficacy of regulation.

Professors Schwartz and van Schewick apparently disagree on the
value of application-level innovation and the efficacy of network
regulation, and its chilling effect on regulation. However, neither
51, 53–55 (2007).
60. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 85, 120–25 (2005) (“This Part discusses how ICE and its exceptions
can help frame and evaluate open access obligations . . . . Our analysis suggests that
regulators should consider two basic questions: whether an exception to ICE exists, and, if
this seems likely, how well the regulator can address the competitive harms that might
result. A regulatory regime that addresses both questions will minimize the opportunity for
anticompetitive conduct while also being less apt to chill efficient conduct.”); van Schewick,
supra note 26, at 388–89 (“[I]t is an open question, whether network neutrality regulation
will reduce incentives to deploy network infrastructure below the necessary level . . . . As a
result, the remaining profit may still be sufficient to motivate them to deploy the necessary
infrastructure.”); Hemphill, supra note 6, at 149 (“If there is a dynamic efficiency effect, it
entails a tradeoff: reduced incentives for entry and investment by content providers,
combined with increased incentives to invest in access provider infrastructure, via the
contribution to fixed costs just mentioned. As a theoretical matter, it is not apparent which
effect is larger.”); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet
Access, 22 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 46, 46 n.258 (2008) (“[F]orcing a monopolist to share an
input rescues other firms from having to supply the relevant input for themselves. A
growing body of empirical scholarship suggests that mandating access to last-mile
broadband networks has deterred investment in precisely this manner.” In support of this
proposition is a long footnote, but not one source provides strong support. Rather, the cited
sources all point to no detectable relationship between forced vertical deintegration and
increased consumer subscribership. This finding could be consistent with any number of
stories related to the effect of forced deintegration and investment.).
61. Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 6, at 9 (“[N]etwork neutrality threatens to
reduce incentives to increase competition through the construction of new networks.
Eliminating the potential for short-run supracompetitive returns would also thwart one of the
primary mechanisms upon which markets rely to stimulate entry.”).
62. Schwartz Jan. 2010 Comments, supra note 57, at 30.
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professors nor anyone in the debate provides a principled way of estimating
these values.
This entire network openness controversy too often reflects an abuse
of economics, asking the discipline to answer questions it currently cannot.
What is worse, these economic arguments have little to say about, and may
even mask, the regulatory debate’s motivating question: how can regulators
estimate the incentive trade-offs that network openness regulation will
inevitably present?

C.

Does Characterizing Broadband Service Provision as a TwoSided Market Further the Analysis?

Beyond the single monopoly rent theorem, many look to what is
known as “two-sided markets” to answer the question of whether
broadband providers would foreclose markets. The typical example of a
double-sided market is credit cards. Consumers want cards that are
accepted by as many merchants as possible, while merchants want to
accept cards that are carried by as many consumers as possible.
Pricing in these markets, as anyone with even a passing interest in
economics is aware, is far from straight forward. Two-sided markets
exhibit network effects (i.e., a credit card brand is worth more to merchants
if more people have them and more to consumers if more merchants accept
them). In order to capture this value created by networks and scale, the
credit card company may price one side of the market (credit card fees or
merchant transaction fees) below a competitive level in order to get more
people “on board.”
Just as with the single monopoly rent theorem, a two-sided market
analysis illuminates the question of whether broadband service providers
would foreclose certain competing services. The idea would be that the
broadband service provider has an incentive to “get more applications and
more subscribers on board” to have a more valuable network. Some have
claimed that two-sided market analysis “suggests” that discrimination will
63
maximize social welfare.

63. See Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture That Challenge
the Status Quo, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 97 (2010) (“The literature suggests that
social welfare would be maximized if the network provider were permitted to price
discriminate on both sides of the two-sided market. It also suggests that the prices paid by
those on each side of the market can differ widely and that in many cases, it is economically
beneficial for one side to subsidize the other side of the market. The fact that the Internet has
become increasingly dominated by advertising revenue paid to content and application
providers suggest that it may be socially beneficial for content and application providers to
subsidize the prices paid by end users.”).
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It is far from clear that two-sided markets apply to broadband
provision. The assumptions one must make are simply too heroic and too
distanced from what is known about market realities. Second, even if one
accepts these models’ applicability, they are largely ambiguous even in
theory. The various models in the literature come to opposite answers. As
even the experts for AT&T concede in the Internet proceeding, the models
64
simply do not give answers that are robust to the likely market conditions.

1. Does Two-Sided Market Analysis Apply to Broadband
Service Provision?
The most basic question as to whether two-sided markets apply to
broadband service providers is identifying the platform they create. It is far
from clear what that platform is. In other words, does the broadband
provider get the two sides “on board”? One could say they do—they
connect applications to users. On the other hand, is Google a “true” twosided market in that it connects users with advertisers? Or does Google
connect users with search results? Only then are websites the “true” twosided markets. Once again, the complexities of online interaction render
questionable even the most basic applicability of economic models.
Let us assume, however, that broadband service providers are the twosided market connecting households to applications. Presumably, more
subscribers would make their network more valuable to content providers,
who then would pay broadband providers more for access to their
65
networks. It would look like this :

64. Comments of AT&T, supra note 36, at 55–58; Schwartz Jan. 2010 Comments,
supra note 57, at 17, Exhibit 3 (“[T]he modern world is flush with two-sided markets, and
that alone has never been thought sufficient to warrant regulatory mandates that the
charging occur only one side. In some two-sided markets both sides pay, in others only one
side pays, and the charging conventions can vary over time. Neither the articles cited in the
NPRM nor the broader economic literature on two-sided markets supports a policy of
banning charges from broadband providers to content providers or vice versa.”).
65. These diagrams are adapted from Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz, The
Economics of Product-Line Restrictions With an Application to the Network Neutrality
Debate, Joint Center AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 0702 (Feb. 2007).
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The most glaring problem is viewing broadband service providers as a
platform because they do not have any contractual relationship with most
content providers. CDNs such as the firm, Akamai, complicate this story
because they provide content directly to broadband service providers.
However, broadband service providers still only have a contractual
relationship with the CDN, which could carry a variety of content providers
ranging from e-Bay to Google. While as discussed above, so little is
publically known about Internet interconnection markets that it is difficult
to generalize. It is a fair assumption that broadband service providers do
not typically have contractual relations with content providers. As such,
they do not receive fees from content providers. The number of “eyeballs”
a broadband service provider can offer a content provider is irrelevant and
should not affect the fees they charge consumers.
Of course, a broadband provider could become a content provider, by
leveraging into the search engine markets. As such, it would have
conflicting incentives to “get subscribers on board” to view content and
foreclose competitors. However, this would not be a two-sided market. It
would be closer to a vertical foreclosure story.
Beyond these most basic problems with applying a two-sided market
theory to broadband service provision, the details of the model turn on
quite tendentious claims about the market. To get a sense of the distance
between these models and reasonable approximations of actual Internet
markets, we examine in some detail one of the most influential models in
66
this debate—that of Hermalin and Katz.
Hermalin and Katz begin by describing the problem as “whether
providers of ‘last mile’ Internet access services . . . should be allowed to
67
offer more than one grade of service.” The fear is “that offering multiple
grades is unfair and results in some consumers’ [sic] being provided unduly
68
low-quality service.” To address this problem, they aim to “examine the
effects of product-line restrictions in markets” where a supplier (e.g., the
“provider[] of ‘last mile’ Internet access services” such as the “local
telephone company offering DSL, a cable company offering cable modem
service, or a wireless service such as 3G”) would otherwise be able to offer
69
a full range of different products. Put otherwise, Hermalin and Katz
investigate the effects of limiting the number of connection quality types
70
that an Internet access provider may offer.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In order to both “simplify analysis” and to address concerns that
“market power lies at the heart of the problem,” they assume that the
71
platform (e.g., the Internet access provider) is a monopoly. They describe
two market structures and lay out the actors for each.
In the first—the “fee-for-service” market structure—a household pays
a transaction fee to an application provider “for each use” while both the
household and the application provider pay the platform for their
72
respective connections. As we discuss above, this is a simplification that
oversimplifies actual broadband service providers’ incentives.

In the second—the “advertiser-supported-content” market structure—
the application provider receives no transaction fee from the household,
73
instead “earn[ing] revenue solely from the sale of advertising.”

Some initial observations can be made about these basic assumptions:
1. Where is the money going? As a factual matter of Internet
connection markets, it does not seem as if broadband providers
receive much money from application providers. The entire peering
and transit market is ignored. As we discuss above, the models
deviate significantly from what we know of Internet markets.
2. Are you distributing or are we communicating? Hermalin and
Katz’s model (“H & K model”) describes households “using” (or later
74
as “consuming a unit of”) an application provider. This description
works well in some instances, e.g., a lawyer (the household) logs onto
Westlaw (the application provider) and “uses” it to research.
However, it is less conceptually congruent with other situations where
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
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the give-and-take between the application provider and the household
does not merely flow from the former to the latter. For example, when
a person (the household) logs onto Wikipedia (the application
provider) and then talks over and revises errors in a topic entry, she is
not obviously “using” (nor “consuming”) Wikipedia. The exchange
might be better described as “participation” rather than “usage,” with
some utility flowing back to the application provider and, in this case,
to third parties whose utility is increased by her contribution. Their
model ignores this two-way flow of utility.
3. Copy and pass this around, and talk amongst yourselves.
Hermalin and Katz’s assumption that the Internet is simply a
distribution method leads to a similar shortcoming: their model does
not account for “peer-to-peer” (“P2P”) networks within the H & K
model. P2P networks can be seen as changing distribution (of the file
from one provider to many users) into participation (with many
people cooperating to share the file). Under the H & K’s model this
“transaction” is poorly captured because the model focuses on flow
from application provider to a household. In BitTorrent, under the H
& K model, the application provider (the person who originally
posted the “.torrent” file and “seeded” the swarm) has incentivized the
households to provide the “distribution channel” amongst themselves.
This allows the application provider to externalize its “distribution”
costs onto the household, or onto the platform to the extent that
“extensive” bandwidth usage (uploading) by households is not
contemplated in their hookup-fees, which would make it a platform
cost.
With these assumptions, Hermalin and Katz produce results under
their two scenarios (fee-for-service and advertiser-supported content). They
model profit maximization under both approaches, describe the welfare
produced, and demonstrate how the platform can capture the household
surplus by setting the hook-up fee for households equal to their total
75
surplus. They show that in the welfare maximizing world the platform
profits would be equal to the total household surplus plus the application
provider price (the price charged to that type of application provider) minus
the cost of providing the connection quality that the application provider
76
would choose.
They then compare two regulatory scenarios: (1) the unrestricted
monopoly platform that would offer a “profit-maximizing, incentivecompatible, individually rational, price schedule”; and (2) when the
75. Id. at 8–9.
76. Id. at 9–10.
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monopoly platform is restricted to offering a single quality. The authors
explain that this can be alternatively viewed as selecting a minimum type
of application provider. This is because the selected single-quality will
exclude all application provider types for which it is not profitable to
connect at that quality. Having shown that both the restricted and the
unrestricted scenarios are suboptimal when compared with the welfaremaximized ideal, the authors next compare the scenarios with each other.
They find that—though it could go either way—the unrestricted scenario
would produce the greatest welfare.
The point of this excursus is not to train the reader in economic
modeling, but to give a sense of this model’s flexibility and ambiguity. We
disagree with the literature that points to such models as providing
guidance to policy. Indeed, even AT&T’s comments in the Open Internet
NPRM concede that two-sided markets applied to broadband service
77
provision have no clear results.

D.

Does Anyone Know Anything About Dynamic Efficiency?

To repeat an oft-heard refrain, the Internet has transformed the nature
of communications, cultural and material production, and innovation.
Economists call the process of innovation and creative development
“dynamic efficiency.” Compared to static or allocative efficiency, which
looks to welfare maximizing allocation of goods given existing costs and
78
demand, dynamic efficiency is far less understood by economists. For
obvious reasons, generalizations about the conditions that generate, let
alone optimize, innovation are difficult to reduce to social scientific law.
Legal academics have spilled much ink pondering the nature of the
radically different communication. For David Post, the Internet allows for
ever greater and newer types of creativity by taking advantage of easily
scalable networks, thereby radically transforming the cost and nature of
79
communication. In other words, the Internet is a unique communications
medium because it lacks a centralized control, splitting messages into bits
77. Schwartz Jan. 2010 Comments, supra note 57, at 22 (“The efficient pricing pattern
in two-sided markets depends in complex and subtle ways on specific conditions in an
industry. Theoretical analyses that yield strong prescriptions hinge on special
assumptions.”).
78. Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 133, 141 (2011) (“Static efficiency is optimization of production within present
technologies to minimize deadweight loss . . . . Dynamic efficiency means increases in
resources through investments in education and research and development. Since the 1950s,
it has been well established that dynamic efficiency is the major source of economic
growth.”).
79. DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF
CYBERSPACE 93–98 (2009).
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and allowing them to be routed in ever changing, adaptable ways. This
80
allows it to store and send more information than any media before it.
Some have looked to the Internet’s end-to-end design principle as a special
driver of innovation. This design principle provides a uniform layer for
computer applications to communicate but allows end users to build
applications on top of this basic layer. Mark Lemley and Lawrence Lessig
argue that the end-to-end principle “expands the competitive horizon by
enabling a wider variety of applications to connect to and to use the
81
network.” Susan Crawford has looked to particular economic theories of
innovation and the Internet’s power to bring people together as creating a
82
special engine of creativity. She argues that growth theorists show that
economic development depends on new ideas, and the Internet is great at
creating new ideas. Tim Wu argues that application competition is essential
83
on the Internet and must be maintained. Mark Lemley and Brett
Frischmann have looked to infrastructure theory and the unique role that
the Internet, as an infrastructure, plays in creating spillover innovations and
84
producing second-order type dynamic efficiencies.

80. Id. at 75; Hearing on “Network Neutrality” Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law,
Stanford Law School) (“If the principle of end-to-end is abandoned, . . . innovators must
now include in their calculation of risk the threat that the network owner might either block
or tax a particular application. That increased risk will reduce application investment.”).
81. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 4, at 931; see also id. at 932 (“Innovation will be
chilled if a potential innovator believes the value of the innovation will be captured by those
that control the network and have the power to behave strategically.”); LESSIG, supra note 4,
at 34–35.
82. Crawford, supra note 33, at 387–88 (“The work of growth theorists reveals that
choices made by governments to stimulate the production of new ideas can have a
significant effect on economic growth . . . . The Internet provides a particularly fertile
environment for the development of these diverse new thoughts that will drive growth. It
supports the development of groups and other forms of online communication that are
potentially highly responsive to the feedback of human beings and highly likely (given the
enormous scale and connectivity of the Internet) to trigger exponential development of
unpredictably diverse new ideas that are nonrivalrous.”).
83. Why Have a Telecommunications Law?, supra note 59, at 37.
84. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 988–89 (2005) (“The market mechanism exhibits a
bias for outputs that generate observable and appropriable benefits at the expense of outputs
that generate positive externalities. This is not surprising because the whole point of relying
on [private] property rights and the market is to enable private appropriation and discourage
externalities. The problem with relying on [private property rights and] the market is that
potential positive externalities may remain unrealized if they cannot be easily valued and
appropriated by those that produce them, even though society as a whole may be better off if
those potential externalities were actually produced.”). But see Beyond Network Neutrality,
supra note 6, at 9.
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These arguments are quite intriguing and have had a tremendous
impact upon the public debate. Law professors have forwarded them at the
FCC in favor of some type of network openness regulation. They have
demonstrated the importance of Internet regulation to economic and
85
cultural development. The FCC seems to accept them to some degree.
These arguments, however, are theories. They have not been
demonstrated despite employing ambiguous formal models, as discussed in
the previous section. And despite the framing attempts by Post, Lemley,
Lessig, Crawford, Wu, and van Schewick, none have rooted instincts to
empirical data. The centralized post office does seem less innovative than
the Internet, but it is unmeasured and, therefore, unverified. The end-to-end
principle seems to have some neat social effects, but a measurement of
these and a comparison of them to a network employing a more
centralizing design principle remains elusive. And the question is not
whether the Internet has lowered the cost of creating and sharing ideas, but
whether something else can do it better.
To illustrate the weakness of these intuitive models in providing
policy guidance, consider this example: Asymmetric DSL is the dominant
broadband technology offered by telephone companies. It has by design
86
higher download speeds than upload speeds. Network engineering does
87
not dictate this result—the telephone company makes this choice. This
88
architectural feature makes asymmetric DSL massively non-neutral. End
users receive downloads, say from a content provider affiliated with the
phone company, faster than end users can upload (and thereby share) usergenerated content. The architecture at some level makes the Internet into
more of a content distribution system than a system that motivates user
innovation, as distribution and centralized content is favored over creation
and user-sharing.
85. See Open Internet NPRM, supra note 9, at para. 8 (“[B]roadband Internet access
service providers may have both the incentive and the means to discriminate in favor of or
against certain Internet traffic and to alter the operation of their networks in ways that
negatively affect consumers, as well as innovators trying to develop Internet-based content,
applications, and services. Such practices have the potential to change the Internet from an
open platform that enables widespread innovation and entrepreneurship . . . .”).
86. See MATTI SIEKKINEN ET AL., PERFORMANCE LIMITATIONS OF ADSL USERS: A CASE
STUDY 145–54 (S. Uhling et al. eds., 2007), http://folk.uio.no/siekkine/pub/siekkinen
07adsl.pdf; Jeff Tyson, How VDSL Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://computer.howstuff
works.com/vdsl3.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“Asymmetric DSL (ADSL) - It is called
‘asymmetric’ because the download speed is greater than the upload speed. ADSL works
this way because most Internet users look at, or download, much more information than they
send, or upload.”).
87. Bradley Mitchell, Symmetric and Asymmetric, ABOUT.COM, http://compnetworking.
about.com/od/dsldigitalsubscriberline/g/bldef_symmetric.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
88. Siekkin, supra note 86, at 145–54.
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Is this a problem? It depends on what solution you seek. If people are
receiving, and want to receive, downloads from a central source, then the
problem is how to provide more download bandwidth. If people are
stymied in their abilities to share their user-generated movies or programs
or other content, then it is a problem.
Even if one were to say that Internet architecture should encourage
one type of production (P2P or video distribution), that does not answer the
quite specific regulatory question: what percentage bandwidth should be
upstream, and what percentage should be downstream in order to provide
incentives for the “proper” amount of user-innovation?

III. NETWORKS DISCRIMINATE, AND NETWORK ENGINEERING
GIVES POLICY MEANS NOT ENDS
In the old circuit-switched telephone networks, any two networks
either connected or did not. In this old network, an actual dedicated circuit
89
connected two end users. Their traffic flowed along this circuit.
Discrimination meant something relatively straightforward: either a
network’s wires connected to the telephone network or they did not. Open
access regimes mandated connection of incumbent monopolist telephone
companies’ networks with competitors and required equal carriage and
90
exchange of traffic. For example, the FCC required local telephone
91
companies to not discriminate among long-distance companies. Local
telephone companies were required to permit all qualifying long-distance
89. MARCOS SILVA PINTO, PERFORMANCE MODELING AND KNOWLEDGE PROCESSING IN
HIGH-SPEED INTERCONNECTED INTELLIGENT EDUCATION NETWORKS 7 (2007) (“In a circuitswitched network, a dedicated physical circuit is first established between the source and the
destination nodes before any data transmission takes place . . . . Furthermore, the circuit
remained in place for the duration of the transmission. The public switched telephone
network (PSTN) is an example of a circuit-switched network. When we place a telephone
call, a direct physical communication path is established between out telephone set and the
receiver’s set. The set is a point-to-point connection that interconnects the telephone
company’s switches, which are located throughout the telephone network. Once established
the circuit is dedicated exclusively to eh current transmission.”)
90 J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT 47 (1997) (“Deregulation of the network industries often is
accompanied by regulatory policies requiring the incumbent utility to provide “open access”
to its transmission and reticulation facilities.”).
91. Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 5 F.C.C.R. 2627, paras. 40–41 (1990) (“The initial impetus for equal access
came from the MFJ and the GTE Consent Decree, which required the BOCs and GTE,
respectively, to provide all IXCs with access that is ‘equal in type and quality’ to that
provided to AT&T. The Commission implemented and expanded these requirements. Equal
access not only ensured that IXCs would receive equal transmission quality, but also that
callers would have the opportunity to presubscribe their telephones to an IXC other than
AT&T.”).
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92

companies to physically connect their wires. Once connected, calls were
93
carried independent of other calls in separate “circuits.” Similarly, the
1996 Act mandated equality access in deregulation of local telephony in the
94
late 1990s.
But today, on the Internet, the circuit between end users is virtual.
Anything sent between end users is shattered into any number of packets,
sent out across the Internet’s network, and later reassembled at the other
95
end. This is the wonder of packet-switching networks. It is misleading to
conceive of a circuit that connects users across such a network. The
96
component networks of the Internet are variously interconnected.
Increasingly, each component network can isolate the kind and count of
packets to carry. This gives the lie to the monistic virtual circuit that
Internet protocols construct and, ultimately, present to end users.
While it is helpful for an application developer to pretend that TCP
creates a connection to another address online and that clicking a link
“fetches” the webpage from that address, these are mere metaphors. Out of
context, these metaphors are misleading. Public policy must analyze not
only what people experience online, but also how those experiences are
realized.
When networks online decline to interconnect, the effect is rarely
absolute. Likely, the end user can still reach some given destination online,
but the packets to or from that destination may be sent round-a-bout or
given less priority. Since the Internet supports an ever-growing variety of
92. THE FROEHLICH/KENT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 344 (1993)
(“Among the things that had to be accomplished [after divestiture of AT&T] were the
implementation of equal-access arrangements so that all long-distance carriers could
compete on an equal basis without significant technical differences or subsidies . . . . Behind
this ambitious implementation program was a major task, namely, the design and
introduction of software into the telephone switching systems to provide the new switching
and transmission features needed for equal access.”).
93. Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Commun. Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 14712 (1999).
94. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (1999) (requiring incumbent local exchange carriers
(“LECs”) to provide to “any requesting telecommunications carrier” interconnection that is
“equal in quality” to the interconnection LEC provides itself and that is “on rates, terms, and
conditions that are . . . nondiscriminatory . . . .”).
95. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11501, para. 64 (1998) (“The Internet is a distributed packet-switched network, which
means that information is split up into small chunks or ‘packets’ that are individually routed
through the most efficient path to their destination. Even two packets from the same
message may travel over different physical paths through the network.”).
96. United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 n.8 (3d. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Internet
is a worldwide communications system composed of an interconnected network of
computers, data lines, routers, servers, and electronic signals.”).
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applications, this more nuanced discrimination by the network becomes
mostly a concern for application developers, who are the front line in the
adaptive dance to convince users that they are connected.
To make sense of network configurations in context, regulators must
know that all networks discriminate—often deliberately—among various
kinds of traffic. These modes of traffic discrimination can be roughly
grouped into three broad categories: building the network, configuring the
network, and interconnecting the network. We explore what each means in
context.
Below is an image depicting the three categories of discrimination,
together with a generalized arrangement of customers, the broadband
access provider, and the interconnected networks.
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What we show is that all networks discriminate, and we classify three
types of discrimination. The FCC’s Open Internet Proceeding and the
network neutrality debate in general take an erroneously narrow view of
discrimination by concentrating on only one type of discrimination:
discriminatory network configuration. Further, as we show, the language to
describe nondiscriminatory network configuration is misguided and
erroneously metaphorical. We conclude that network discrimination, as a
concept, reflects an inconsistent and incoherent regulatory standard.

A.

Selecting Where and What to Build

The first way network owners discriminate is in where and how they
build the physical components of their network. A network owner may
choose to build in urban rather than rural areas to enjoy increased customer
density. A cable broadband provider may delay rolling out DOCSIS 2.0
97
and 3.0 —which better support streaming and P2P video—to avoid
98
cannibalizing its cable television revenue.
Meanwhile, a wireless
broadband provider might delay rolling out EVDO Rev A and later
99
100
WiMAX or LTE —which better support VoIP —to avoid cannibalizing
its cell phone revenue.

97. These are two of the standards used by cable broadband providers in their physical
network. Connect America Fund: A Nat’l Broadband Plan for Our Future: High-Cost
Universal Serv. Support, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 F.C.C.R.
6657, 6859 (2010) [hereinafter National Broadband Notice of Inquiry] (“Data Over Cable
Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS)—A cable modem standard from the CableLabs
research consortium (www.cablelabs.com), which provides equipment certification for
interoperability. DOCSIS supports IP traffic (Internet traffic) over digital cable TV
channels, and most cable modems are DOCSIS compliant. Some cable companies are
currently deploying third-generation (DOCSIS 3.0) equipment. Originally formed by four
major cable operators and managed by Multimedia Cable Network System, the project was
later turned over to CableLabs.”).
98. Shifting from “flat web pages and email” to “P2P services,” and then to “clickstreaming” (e.g., Hulu) has caused wide variability in the symmetry ratio (the amount a user
downloaded divided by the amount uploaded) on cable broadband networks. See e.g., Leslie
Ellis, Split the Node, or Do DOCSIS?, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Nov. 23, 2008, 7:00 PM)
http://www.multichannel.com/article/101980-Split_the_Node_or_Do_DOCSIS _.php (“So,
in a dozen years, traffic symmetry went from 18:1, to 2.5:1, to around 5:1. These are trends
that matter to the overall scalability of any two-way network.”).
99. These are some of the standards for wireless broadband. VERIZON, LTE: THE
FUTURE OF MOBILE BROADBAND TECHNOLOGY 2–4 (2010), http://opennetwork.
verizonwireless.com/pdfs/VZW_LTE_White_Paper_12-10.pdf
100. See QUALCOMM INC, EV-DO REV. A AND B: WIRELESS BROADBAND FOR THE
MASSES 8 (2007), http://www.qualcomm.com/media/documents/files/ev-do-rev-and-bwireless-broadband-masses-whitepaper.pdf (“One of the most significant changes Rev. A
brings is the improved RL. The redesigned link provides a significant speed and capacity
improvement, and is designed to support low latency applications such as VoIP.”).
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Elsewhere, buildout discrimination conflicts with explicit social goals,
101
like universal service in telephony. The FCC’s National Broadband Plan
is precisely such an effort to direct network expansion to counteract this
102
type of discrimination in broadband rollout.
As in the past, the FCC
planned implicit and explicit subsidies to counter this tactic, like the
103
various rural subsidy programs.
This reflects a federal policy goal of
universal service, a goal that was decided not by economics or
104
engineering,
but by persuasion and politics—the tools for reconciling
105
conflicts among competing social goals.
While all network buildout
discriminates in some way, nondiscriminatory buildout is chimerical.

B.

Configuring to Discriminate

Once the physical infrastructure is in place, a network operator further
discriminates by how it configures the devices on the network. Here the
discrimination is most explicit. This configuration is where network
neutrality debates rage. This is the mode of discrimination that the FCC and
most policy analysts have focused. As we will demonstrate, it is where the
Comcast, Madison River, and current proceedings have all focused their
106
attention. It is not the only place, but it is the first place where a bit can
be something more than just a bit.
A network configuration necessarily discriminates among various
competing uses. Even a simplistic “best effort” network discriminates
against applications that would work better over some other kind of
101. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(2) (2006) (“Access to advanced telecommunications
and information services should be provided in all regions of the Nation.”).
102. See National Broadband Notice of Inquiry, supra note 97.
103. Connect America Fund, A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, Noticed of
Proposed Rulemaking and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 F.C.C.R. 4554, para.
46 (2011) (“A primary policy objective of regulators during the 20th century was to promote
universal service through affordable local telephone rates for residential customers. To
accomplish this objective, regulators created a patchwork of implicit subsidies. Thus, for
example regulators permitted higher rates to business customers so that residential rates
could be lower, and they frequently required similar rates for urban and rural customers,
even though the cost of serving rural customers was higher. Similarly, AT&T was permitted
to charge artificially high long-distance toll rates, and then shared a portion of these
interstate revenues with independent telephone companies and AT&T’s Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs).”).
104. While some defend rural subsidies on grounds of “spillover” effects, these are
speculative. The decision to provide a subsidy is best understood as a raw political choice:
everyone should have access to the Internet. See generally, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996) (creating
the FCC “[f]or the purpose of regulating . . . to make available . . . to all the people of the
United States . . . communication service . . . at reasonable charges . . . .”).
105. MILTON MUELLER, UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION, AND
MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM 165–66 (1997).
106. See infra Sec. IV.
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107

network.
To understand the implications of network configurations
requires understanding their jargon and methods.
But policy analysts, looking for normative standards, should walk
carefully into the terminology of configuring networks. The analytic
devices that are useful to engineers do not directly translate into legal,
regulatory language. This is especially true here with terms like “best
effort,” “fairness,” and “trust.” This area is filled with seemingly normative
terms that instead are descriptive references to network components. This
brief introduction will give preliminary guidance for comprehending the
larger meaning of these network configurations.

1. “Best Effort”
The term “best effort” is misleading. Network engineers use it to
108
describe a single default treatment of traffic.
To some, this seems to
109
define a neutral network. But is anything really the best if they are all the
same? You are a special little snowflake . . . just like everyone else. Of
course nobody wants your worst effort. Or what if something else is
actually treated better? It is literally inaccurate to call it “best” when some
are treated better, and it is misleading if none are treated worse.
This casual misuse is similar to that surrounding the anachronistic
“most favored nation” (“MFN”) terminology from the international trade
110
lexicon. The misuse of the MFN term—China violates human rights and
107. The notion that a best efforts network constitutes some sort of nondiscriminatory
ideal is endemic to the debate. See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an
Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 26 (2009); Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier For
Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 277–79 (2008) (“The Internet developed
initially as an academic curiosity, based on a commitment to the ‘end-to-end principle.’ This
principle requires that all Internet traffic, whether an email, a Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) ‘call,’ or a video stream, be treated equally and managed through ‘best efforts’
connections.”).
108. See JOHN EVANS & CLARENCE FILSFILS, DEPLOYING IP AND MPLS QOS FOR
MULTISERVICE NETWORKS—THEORY AND PRACTICE 89 (2007) (describing the misuse of
“best-effort” since “[b]y definition, best-effort infers no SLA commitments and hence a
service which provides any SLA commitments cannot be defined as best-effort, however
lowly those commitments might be.”).
109. Robert X. Cringely, We Don’t Need No Stinking Best Effort: Net Neutrality May
Have Been Just a Fantasy All Along, PBS.ORG: I, CRINGLEY (Apr. 12, 2007)
http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/2007/pulpit_20070412_001931.html (“I looked in the
RFCs and saw that the Internet was defined as a ‘best effort’ network, which seemed to
embody the principles of net neutrality.”).
110. In the World Trade Organization, MFN does not mean any kind of special
treatment as the name suggests, rather it “means non-discrimination—treating virtually
everyone equally.” Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/ english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
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they are a most favored nation!—prompted Congress to replace MFN with
the more accurate “normal trade relations” since the MFN principle was
never supposed to treat any nation as most favored but instead to treat them
111
all the same.
Similarly, some engineers have discarded best-efforts
terminology in favor of less rhetorically vulnerable alternatives to describe
112
a network that gives the same treatment to all traffic. The point here is
that best effort really just means a generic treatment of traffic. It just means
113
normal effort.
When a network employs some policy other than “best
effort,” we must then ask what traffic is not given “normal” treatment.

2. “Quality of Service”
When a network treats all types of traffic the same (i.e., it uses “best
effort”) but wants to ensure support for an application, it can only do so by
114
overprovisioning network capacity. However, network capacity is costly.
So when a network provider wants to support an application without
incurring the costs of overprovisioning, it will implement traffic routing
policies called “quality of service” (“QOS”) mechanisms. QOS
mechanisms identify certain classes of traffic and give them a specified
115
treatment. This is where network discrimination is made explicit.
2012). Both MFN and best effort usefully describe a certain kind of generic treatment, but
the literal meaning of each (“most” and “best”) is lost amidst the long list of exceptions
(“more than most” and “better than best”). Beyond this shared inaccuracy, the analogy can
be stretched a bit further still. A packet receives best-effort treatment (like MFN treatment)
so long as it does not fall within a specified class that gets better treatment (like regional
trade agreements, e.g., NAFTA). Or they may be treated worse than best-effort if they fall
within a class such as blocked SPAM (like non-MFN states that may be subjected to trade
sanctions or embargo).
111. H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. § 5003 (1998) (enacted).
112. E.g., EVANS & FILSFILS, supra note 108, at 88 (“The term best-effort . . . is often
misused.”); see also id. at 113 (opting to use “single service class IP network” instead of
“best efforts”).
113. We might let this little misnomer slide, except that it causes two problems. It does
not mean what it says, so it becomes less useful as an analytical device for engineers. But,
more relevant here, it is often misused by outsiders to actually mean what it says. The
engineers amongst themselves might be able to overlook the term’s flaws: call it a kind of
professional hazing to require new initiates to internalize the jargon. But the danger of
leaving it inaccessible crops up when the outsiders try to use the language anyway, and fail.
114. See EVANS & FILSFILS, supra note 108, at 87–88 (“If it is possible to ensure that
there is always significantly more capacity available than there is traffic load then . . . the
service requirements will be easy to meet.”).
115. Although QOS is often less costly than merely over-provisioning, the amount
provisioned (capacity planning) is still an important part of an effective QOS
implementation. Id. at 375–76 (describing how capacity planning is required whether or not
QOS mechanisms are implemented). So some over-provisioning is still required at a given
node, depending on the distribution of arriving traffic and on the link speed. Id. at 383 (“The
over-provisioning factor . . . depends upon the arrival distribution of the traffic on the link,
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The traffic treatment selected to support the application turns on two
factors: (1) a presumption about the application’s technical requirements;
and (2) the value of that particular application’s performance relative to
other uses of the network. These are then both used, theoretically, to
“maximize end-user satisfaction (utility or efficacy) while minimizing
116
cost.”
To examine the first factor, we look at a hypothetical corporation that
has an existing, fully managed, and internal corporate network—they
control the users, the devices, everything. At the outset, the network gives
no special treatment to any kind of traffic (that is, it gives generic “best
effort” treatment to all traffic). Now imagine this business decides it wants
to support a private VoIP network for its employees to use internally. It
will use QOS to support this, since it wants to support the application
without having to massively buildout network capacity (recall,
overprovisioning network capacity is always an alternative to QOS
mechanisms).
The corporation’s network engineers (or those of the service provider
it hires) will translate the requirements of the selected VoIP application into
117
a set of quality metrics with ranges of acceptable values. These metrics
are then used to design the network and to check whether the network has
118
met the requirements.
When the network designers select a set of
minimum quantities for these quality metrics—if they are made explicit—
the minimum quantities are called the service level agreement (“SLA”)
119
requirements for that application.
Thus, the SLA requirements are the
first factor influencing the treatment that the class of traffic receives; they
are the presumed technical requirements of the application that creates the
traffic.
The second influence on QOS policy is the relative value that is
120
attached to that application’s performance.
To understand this, we
continue with the corporate scenario above. Imagine the CTO wants to
and the link speed.”).
116. Id. at 88–89.
117. The most important of these metrics are delay, delay variation (“jitter”), packet
loss, throughput, availability, and sequence preservation. Id. at 2. See also id. at 4–7 (delay);
id. at 8 (delay variation); id. at 9–11 (packet loss); id. at 12–18 (throughput); id. at 20–22
(availability); id. at 18–19 (sequence preservation). There are certainly other metrics that are
used, but these tend to be more application specific. Id. at 24 (describing voice, video, and
gaming “quality of experience” measures).
118. Id. at 87–90.
119. Id.
120. WILLIAM B. NORTON, THE INTERNET PEERING PLAYBOOK: CONNECTING TO THE
CORE OF THE INTERNET 49 (draft 2011), available at http://www.nanog.org/papers/
playbook.doc.
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make sure that his boss, the CEO, has excellent quality for all his VoIP
calls. The CTO has already crafted SLA requirements (a selection of values
from the ranges of each quality metric required by the application) that will
provide “good” VoIP service to the entire company with the currently
available network capacity. But when he decides to spoil his boss, he is
constrained by costs so he cannot just build out network capacity. Instead
he creates two classes of VoIP service: one for the CEO’s calls (with
“excellent” SLA requirements) and one for the rest of the company’s calls
(with slightly reduced SLA requirements).
The rest of the company’s traffic must have slightly reduced SLA
requirements because the cost-constrained network capacity must now
support the CEO’s “excellent” class of VoIP traffic as well. These two
classes of VoIP traffic receive treatment based not only on the applicationspecific requirements of VoIP (the first discussed factor) but also on the
relative value of each class (the CEO’s valued higher than the rest). The
CTO’s decision—to treat the CEO’s calls better than the rest of the calls—
is an example of the second factor influencing the QOS policy of the
corporation’s network: the relative value of each class. Taken together,
121
these two factors dictate QOS policy. The first factor is derived from the
122
technical application requirements and is, in that sense, objective.
The
second factor involves the more subjective valuing of the communications
themselves.
The corporate scenario described above makes one very dangerous
assumption: that the network is fully managed by the operator. This is a
critical difference between this hypothetical network and the public
123
Internet, which is not fully managed.
Even though the public Internet is not fully managed, as in our
hypothetical, this story is important. It explains some of the unreality that
unfolds when network engineers and policy makers try to talk. Network
engineers make things work; that is what engineers do. The fully managed
scenario described above is the sort of problem that they are trained to
121. Id. at 50–51.
122. Id. at 50–52.
123. The network, as the boundary of administrative control, has deep roots. One
ambition of the original DARPA project of designing the Internet protocols was “to come to
grips with the problem of integrating a number of separately administrated entities into a
common utility.” See David Clark, The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet
Protocols, 18 SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV. 106, 106–14 (1988) (describing “some of
the early reasoning which shaped the Internet protocols” to explain “why the protocol is as it
is”). There is far more to say on this, but for now, it is important to see that two concerns of
network neutrality are who and when: (1) who is making the valuation of the relative
benefits between classes of traffic—a role played by the CTO in our story; and (2) when the
valuation is being made—before or after the application is available for use-testing.
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solve. Much of the engineering jargon that is misused by policy analysts
was developed to reflect this fully managed perspective on network
engineering. So it is misleading when used in the context of the public
Internet.

C.

Selective and “Fair” Interconnection

The final way a network discriminates is by choosing to interconnect
with select networks in select locations. This blends many of the dynamics
of buildout and configuration discrimination. Like buildout, the decision to
interconnect is a broad strategic decision. Indeed, interconnection is often a
substitute for buildout. Like nimble network reconfiguration, once two
networks are situated nearby, they can cheaply interconnect (or
124
disconnect).
The ongoing costs of traffic carriage across the interconnection
complicate the negotiation, even when you ignore the external
discriminatory goals of the participants. This bargaining is not
125
straightforward; indeed it is an art.
Between two networks it can be
difficult to agree ex ante on what constitutes a fair exchange. An entrant
acquires market presence as it grows its array of interconnections. These
interconnections can be either to reduce transit costs or to improve
126
performance.
At some point the relative contribution the growing
network makes to any given interconnection exchange begins to flip: the
consumer becomes the producer. Thus, a dominant network, faced with an
up-and-coming network wanting to interconnect, has a shifting mix of
incentives to strike a deal (or not). Moreover, a network can bluff about
connectivity, surprise with traffic loads, or circumvent the interconnected
127
network entirely by connecting directly with its adjacent networks.
At the 2009 Workshop on Internet Economics, Ike Elliott proposed a set of
128
“fair peering” principles.
He opened with a discussion of how peer
networks should behave. He did not discuss any network’s possible interest
in discrimination or “unfairness.” Rather, he focused on the network’s cost
and bargained-for expectations during the sale or exchange of traffic
carriage. His principles were aimed at reducing arbitrage: the profitable,

124. See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 110 and accompanying text.
125. NORTON, supra note 120, at 2, 4.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 4, 7–9.
128. K.C. CLAFFY, WORKSHOP ON INTERNET ECONOMICS (WIE 2009) REPORT 3 (2009),
www.caida.org/publications/papers/2010/wie_report/wie_report.pdf.
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but efficiency-warping, practice of dumping unexpected traffic loads across
129
cheaply or freely interconnected networks.
His principles create a system for tracking usage among “fair peers”
and detecting imbalances. The goal is to place equal cost on each peer, and
the principles do this by having each “fair peer” announce the costs
associated with each type of traffic.
130
The example scenario he gives involves two peers, A and B. They
interconnect to carry three types of traffic from each other: local, regional,
and transoceanic—with costs of one, five, and ten, respectively. It is easy
to see the imbalance if A passes off only local traffic while B passes off
mostly transoceanic traffic. In this scenario, the fair peering principles
create mechanisms for B to correct the imbalance.

One mechanism is for B to simply reduce or stop sending so much of
the costly traffic over A’s network by using other routes. Another
mechanism is for B to peer with A in other locations so that A does not
have to carry B’s traffic as far. And “as a last resort,” B could simply pay
A. Beyond reducing arbitrage (the primary benefit), Elliott suggests that
131
these principles may have other follow-on benefits. One is to encourage
interconnections in more geographic places. This decentralizing could

129. Id. at 3 (equating “fair peering” with the elimination of these economic windfalls).
To a market participant, this “efficiency-warping” practice is helpfully described as
“unfair.” Id.
130. NORTON, supra note 120, at 2.
131. Id.
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reduce the vulnerabilities associated with having a small number of peering
132
locations carrying such a large chunk of the Internet’s traffic.
Elliott attempts to harness the floating mix of incentives at play to
simplify negotiations and reduce transaction costs for interconnecting
networks. This is an area worth investigating for anyone seeking to
understand interconnection markets. But this mix of incentives faces
another complexity when we add the overarching incentives to
discriminate. This is the secondary inquiry that public policy analysts must
investigate. Industry has an interest in reducing uncertainty in negotiations
(except those who profit from it by a dicey game of digital brinkmanship).
It is the public policy analysts that must decipher and account for the
potentially discriminatory interconnection practices along dimensions other
than simple traffic profile.
A network that would like to discriminate, but is prohibited from
discriminating because of its network configuration or its network buildout,
can still achieve the same discriminatory end by interconnecting. It can
“outsource” the discriminatory tasks to an adjacent interconnected network
133
that will do the job.
Instead of discriminating with a flat refusal to
interconnect, a network can use this tactic and its corollaries for a
significant premium. These techniques hide the real power that shapes
traffic discrimination online. Further, the notion of fair interconnection
makes no real sense; enforcing (or even determining) terms and conditions
of an ideally socially efficient interconnection is well beyond policy
makers’ abilities.

IV. AN EMPIRICAL, NONTHEORETICAL LAW OF THE OPEN
INTERNET
The debate about Internet openness has proceeded in abstraction. We
have shown that this has led regulators down several blind alleys. While
getting tangled in speculative economics, legal and policy analysts have
ignored the actual structure of Internet markets. Moreover, the failure to
analyze the meaning of discrimination in a packet-switched network has
led many in the debate to apply theoretical, even metaphorical, solutions
that lack practical applications and leave engineers scratching their heads.
For instance, Internet pioneer David Clark remarked that “[m]ost of what
132. Id.
133. See Marsden, supra note 29, at 7 (“[S]uch discrimination may possibly be detected
by the end-user when it is conducted by its ISP, while a far more pernicious and potentially
undetectable discrimination may occur at peering points.”) (“The debate in regard to the
subtleties of service degradation is beyond this article, and experts at the Paris conference of
29 May 2007 were divided as to whether degradation that is deliberate could be well enough
disguised to suggest off-net discrimination.”). Id. at 7 n.13.
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we have seen so far [concerning internet openness] . . . either greatly
overreaches, or is so vague as to be nothing but a lawyer’s employment
134
act.”
Instead of using a top down, theory-to-reality approach, we argue for
a bottom up, fact-to-theory approach. Actual disputes, such as the
BitTorrent-Comcast disputes, Cogent-Level 3 disconnection, and the
135
Madison River case, are not about discrimination. To the contrary, other
concerns, such as the integrity of messages and privacy or the reliability of
communications, seem to control.
Since what is important is not equality of treatment but equality of
outcomes of Internet experience, Internet regulations must be open to
myriad values and normative goals. Like the common law, it must be able
to grow and change along with the Internet and its role in our society. We,
therefore, side with the FCC employing adjudication rather than ex ante
136
rulemaking. Agencies have tremendous liberty to determine whether to
use rulemaking, which yields a law-like rule of general application, or
adjudication, which involves judicial-like decisions of actual controversies
137
and the emergence of flexible principles.
In developing this body of regulatory law, we suggest looking to the
copyright “fair use” doctrine as a conceptual model. While some have
rightfully complained that fair use is too uncertain and unpredictable for
modern technology, it nonetheless does its job. It balances the set of
productive incentives given to the original author against the set of
incentives for the next author. Additionally, it leaves a realm of judicial
flexibility where islands of certainty emerge, but the outer reaches remain
subject to changed circumstances. This is precisely the kind of balancing
138
the Internet needs.
Internet regulation must balance the need to spur
134. David D. Clark, Network Neutrality: Words of Power and 800-Pound Gorillas, 1
INT'L J. COMM. 701, 708 (2007).
135. BitTorrent Order, supra note 18; Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
136. We agree with Philip Weiser, who has also argued for adjudication as opposed to
rulemaking for Internet disputes. See Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529 (2009).
137. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
138. We recognize that any regulation policy that serves multiple masters may end up
serving neither well. See Lili Levi, Reflections on the FCC's Recent Approach To Structural
Regulation of The Electronic Mass Media, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 581, 617 (2000) (“One of
those questions arises out of the contending values served by structural deregulation in a
converging media environment. But another is whether a multipart strategy such as the one
the Commission appears to be following can adequately neutralize the concerns posed by
media consolidation. Questions as to the viability of such an approach are raised both in
principle and in the context of concrete attacks on the particular strategies chosen by the
Commission to achieve its goal of regulatory balance.”). Given the multitude of value that
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infrastructure investment against the need to preserve the ever-changing
social interest in the content that rides across it.
Rather than a single rule, the fair use doctrine is a patchwork of
rulings made by judges, which set out the growing bounds of this body of
139
law.
Many things are clearly prohibited, while others proceed under
flexible standards. To see how this would work for Internet regulations, the
following discusses the major Internet controversies, showing the values
and issues they involve that reach beyond simplistic discrimination.

A.

BitTorrent-Comcast Controversy

BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing protocol that can efficiently
140
employ any unused bandwidth in a network.
Comcast—ostensibly to
conserve bandwidth—began to take steps to prevent users from using
BitTorrent on its network. It inspected packets that traversed its network,
and when it detected BitTorrent sessions between users, it would forge
141
packets to simulate the termination of the session. It then inserted these
142
spoofed packets into the BitTorrent stream.
These packets, when
received by the end user’s computers, instructed them that the other was no
143
longer communicating, i.e., the other side had gone away.
To use a
metaphor, this technique was like a telephone company breaking in on your
telephone call and impersonating one party and saying, “Oh, gotta go.” The
144
other party then hangs up.
Network users discovered Comcast’s behavior, and a public interest
145
group brought a complaint against the FCC.
The FCC declared
146
Comcast’s actions illegal. The FCC’s stated rationale demonstrates how
difficult it is to codify discrimination in the context of network regulations.
impact on Internet interconnection regulation has, we argue that a multivalent approach is
inevitable.
139. Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance and
Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 520 (2002) (“While fair
use exceptions to copyright presently cover a patchwork of rights accorded to consumers,
librarians, and educators, some commentators would simplify this regime by focusing
copyright restrictions on commercial.”).
140. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 644; see Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet
Traffic, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 19, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/10/19/AR2007101900842.html.
141. See Svensson, supra note 140.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. To return to earlier discussion of packets versus circuit-switched networks, this
involved breaking the virtual circuit. Notably, the analogy to the broken telephone call
equates the virtual and the real circuits.
145. BitTorrent Order, supra note 18, at paras. 1–7.
146. BitTorrent Order, supra note 18, at paras. 6, 10.
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What motivated the proceeding was the nature of Comcast’s traffic
management.
Comcast secretly “broke into” parties’ conversations. The sanctity of
private communications, at least from government snooping, has been
recognized from the earliest times in our history. The Continental
Congress, when it assumed control of the postal system, forbade the
147
reading or interception of mail.
The Act authorizing the first postal
system contained similar protections. In the nineteenth century, in Ex Parte
Jackson, the Supreme Court held that letters enjoyed Fourth Amendment
148
protections,
which at least according to some, formed the basis of the
constitutional protection of privacy in electronic communications under the
149
150
Fourth Amendment.
In response to Olmstead v. United States,
a
Supreme Court case that held Fourth Amendment protections did not apply
to electronic communications, the 1934 Communications Act prohibited
any person not authorized by the sender to intercept any wire or radio
151
152
communications. Finally, in Katz v. United States and Berger v. New
153
York,
the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead and extended Fourth
Amendment protections to telephone communications.
Similarly, keeping telephone companies from using private
information has long been protected. Wiretapping laws apply to telephone
companies; they cannot listen to or monitor your conversation except when
154
required for management of their networks. Strict regulation concerning
147. AN ORDINANCE FOR REGULATING THE POST OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, J. CONT’L. CONG. 1774–1789 670, 671 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1914) (“And be it
further ordained by the authority aforesaid, that the Postmaster General, his clerk or
assistant, his deputies, and post and express-riders, and messengers, or either of them, shall
not knowingly or willingly open, detain, delay, secrete, embezzle or destroy, or cause,
procure, permit or suffer to be opened, detained, delayed, secreted, embezzled or destroyed
any letter or letters . . . .”).
148. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (“Letters and sealed packages of this
kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection . . . as if they were
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.”) (emphasis added).
149. See Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of
Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 554–56 (2007).
150. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
151. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2006) (“[N]o person receiving, assisting in receiving,
transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
thereof . . . . No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication . . . .”).
152. 389 U.S. 347, 364–67 (1967).
153. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
154. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2006) (A communications firm may intercept, use,
or disclose a communication if “necessary incident to the rendition of his service . . . except
that a provider . . . shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for
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telephone companies’ abilities to store and use customer data has existed
155
for decades.
Congress expressly limited the power of communications
firms, including Internet service providers, from disclosing contents of
156
electronic messages.
Given this background of privacy laws and expectations, Comcast’s
actions were reprehensible because its actions violated the integrity of
messages—something the post office has been prohibited from doing since
the time of the Continental Congress. Ignoring this salient issue, the FCC’s
order simply determined that its treatment of BitTorrent was not
157
“reasonable network management.”
Its analysis was remarkably weak
and demonstrates the problem of determining a general rule for network
discrimination.
As we have argued, a rule distinguishing good from bad
discrimination is by nature contextual. To determine reasonableness, the
FCC, drawing on constitutional jurisprudence, stated that any network
158
management protocol must be narrowly tailored to deal with congestion.
This whole system of shifting presumptions and quasi-constitutional tests
the FCC used is completely novel and has no precedent in any FCC
regulatory process. Nor is it clear why this approach should be used. To
determine the degree to which Comcast’s treatment of BitTorrent was
narrowly tailored, the FCC first simply footnoted several Internet
159
experts. Whatever the merits of the FCC’s result, simply assembling a
list of experts hardly constitutes a cognizable rule. Second, the FCC ruled
that Comcast’s treatment of BitTorrent was not reasonable because (1) it is
application specific (only applies to P2P); (2) it is not specific to the time
of congestion; and (3) it is not specific to geographic areas of congestion.
This is a remarkably weak analysis because by focusing on congestion, it
leaves unanswered the questions about other clearly acceptable network
discrimination, like that against spam or malware. This type of
discrimination is application-specific, and it is neither time nor geography
sensitive. Would antispam or antimalware efforts be “reasonable network
management?” Why? Both antimalware and Comcast’s BitTorrent
mechanical or service quality control checks.”).
155. See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 567 n.190 (D.D.C. 1987),
rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 900 F. 2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (limiting the ability of the Bell
companies to collect and use customer data out of a fear that it would become a “‘Big
Brother’ type relationship with all those residing in its regions”); see 47 U.S.C. § 222
(2006).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b) (2006).
157. BitTorrent Order, supra note 18, at paras. 13–15.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 46–48.
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treatment arguably treat certain traffic differently so that the entire network
benefits. The FCC’s myopia has failed to set forth any cognizable rule or
regulatory aim.

B.

Cogent-Sprint Disconnection

In October 2008, Sprint Nextel, a company that controls significant
parts of the Internet backbone, severed its peering connection with Cogent,
preventing Sprint customers from seeing Cogent-hosted sites. Cogent has
filed suit, and the two sides sued each other. The dispute involved
allegations that Cogent was not meeting its obligation for traffic volume
160
under the peering agreement,
although this is simply speculation
because, as discussed above, all such agreements are typically secret. The
161
parties settled and eventually restored connection a few days later.
162
Even this short traffic outage created a bit of an uproar.
The
question is why this short outage incited concern. After all, many goods
and services malfunction without creating a sense of panic or outrage. The
answer is simply that we expect, and come to expect, a high degree of
reliability from our communications networks. This is no accident. The
FCC and state public service commission had, and continue to have,
exacting QOS regulation for telephone service, specifying everything from
163
the number of allowable dropped calls to the acceptable static levels.
The expectation of reliability is not irrational. Reliable
communications is a public good, for it facilitates emergency responders
and other government functions, public discourse, and economic efficiency.
Modern life relies upon it. It may be an appropriate area for regulation,
because the market may not provide an optimal level to all segments in

160. Shane Greenstein, Glimmers and Signs of Innovative Health in The Commercial
Internet, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 25, 66–68 (2010).
161. See Jacqueline Emigh, Sprint Restores Cogent Network Connection, but Only for
Now, BETANEWS, INC., http://www.betanews.com/article/Sprint-restores-Cogent-networkconnection-but-only-for-now/1225738880.
162. Scott Woolley, The Day the Web Went Dead, FORBES (Dec. 2, 2008, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/01/cogent-sprint-regulation-tech-enter-cz_sw_1202cogent.
html.
163. See, e.g., FCC, REPORT OF INDUSTRY ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION,
QUALITY OF SERVICE OF INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS 1 (2009) (examining the
quality of service provided to both retail customers (business and residential) and access
customers (interexchange carriers)); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant
Carriers, Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4 F.C.C.R.
2873, para. 2 (1989) (discussing FCC’s monitoring of quality of service of AT&T); NAT’L
REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE QUALITY iv (1996)
(indicating that thirty-two state regulatory commissions and the District of Columbia have
instituted quality of service standards since the AT&T divestiture).
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society. But this concern has nothing to do with network openness or
neutrality.

C.

Madison River

The Madison River Telephone Company controversy involved a
164
small telephone company that also provided Internet access service.
Interestingly, the company received an enormous percentage of its revenue
165
from long distance service. Perhaps due to these financial pressures, it
decided to block access to VoIP providers, like Vonage, that provided long
distance at a much cheaper rate using an Internet connection. The blocking
was quite blatant and obvious: the Internet ports that carry VoIP. This
action led to an FCC enforcement inquiry that determined Madison River’s
166
action to be illegal. The FCC entered into a consent decree with Madison
River that avoided consideration of the deep legal and policy issues related
167
to the network.
Of these controversies, Madison River is closest to a pure
discrimination issue. The discrimination was blatant: the ports were
blocked. The motivation clear: Madison River had significant revenue to
protect. Anticompetitive intent was reasonable to infer.
The Madison River controversy reflects a reasonable approach to
Internet regulation. Rather than announce a rule of general application, the
Madison River adjudication creates a clear rule that operates on a distinct
set of facts relying on and building upon a set of general principles. Like
fair use, this approach does not presume to determine every case but rather
examines the facts of each. It provides guidance on specific sets of facts,
creating islands of certainty without relying on broad principles fraught
with unforeseen results.

V. A JURISDICTIONAL POSTSCRIPT
As expected, the affected industries appealed the Open Internet
Order, and the case is currently before the D.C. Circuit.168 The chief issue
on appeal almost certainly will be jurisdiction: whether the 1934
Communications Act, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
gives the FCC the authority to regulate the Internet. The legal issue
164. Madison River Comms., LLC, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, para. 3 (2005)
[hereinafter Madison River]; see also Brenner, supra note 6.
165. Local telephone companies make money from long distance by collecting legally
mandated fees from long distance companies for the origination and termination of long
distance traffic.
166. Madison River, supra note 164.
167. Id.
168. Verizon v. FCC, Case No: 11-1355 (D.C.C. Oct. 5, 2011).
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proceeds from a strange regulatory history which recent debates have
obscured. If the D.C. Circuit vacates the Open Internet Order, the
deregulation of national communications will have occurred almost sub
rosa through a strange alignment of an ambiguous statute and an
ideologically hostile D.C. Circuit. No fair reading of the 1934
Communications Act—or the amending 1996 Act—could conclude that the
Congress ever intended, or even contemplated, a complete retreat from
regulating the dominant medium of communication, whether telephones or
Internet.
Contrary to much judicial and scholarly opinion, we argue that the
statutory definitions cannot be controlling, because they are inherently
ambiguous. Instead, a fair reading of the statute reveals unchanged
statutory structure in which the FCC has—and always has had—regulatory
authority over the primary means of national communications. This
argument is historical—and thus we must tell a strange, if not sometimes
dry, story. Let us begin.
In the beginning, there was Section 201 of the Communications Act
of 1934. It is incredibly broad and, for legislation written in 1934, quite
forward-thinking in its “technological neutrality.” It states:
It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or
foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such
communication service upon reasonable request therefor; and, in
accordance with the orders of the Commission, in cases where the
Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such action necessary
or desirable in the public interest, to establish physical connections
with other carriers, to establish through routes and charges applicable
thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to establish and provide
169
facilities and regulations for operating such through routes.

Section 201 regulated anything that could be characterized as a “common
carrier” that used “wire or radio.” Common carrier refers to “any person
engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio or interstate or foreign radio transmission
170
of energy . . . .”
The FCC regulated myriad technologies under this
171
provision from telephones and telegraphs to “message cables,” i.e., early
172
data-carrying wires.
The power to regulate these entities as common
169. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006).
170. Id. § 153(10).
171. Tomas Nonnenmacher, History of the U.S. Telegraph Industry, EH.NET (Feb. 1,
2012, 5:21 PM), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/nonnenmacher.industry.telegraphic.us.
172. Overseas Comms. Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 622, para.
3 (1980) [hereinafter Overseas NPRM]; see Gregg Daffner, Note, United States Regulation
of International Record Telecommunications: The Domestic/International and
Basic/Enhanced Dichotomies in U.S. Telecommunication Regulation, 3 B.U. INT’L L. J. 99,
100–01 (1985).
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carriers is broad and not limited to telephony but rather to any electronic
message carried by wire. It is an error to state, as Commissioner McDowell
did, citing the D.C. Circuit, in his dissent to the Open Internet Order, that
“Titl[e] II . . . of the Communications Act give[s] the FCC the power to
regulate specific, recognized classes of electronic communications services,
173
which consist of common carriage telephony . . . .”
Beginning in the 1960s, however, new computer technologies
emerged that used telephone wires to transmit data and presented the
question of whether Section 201 should regulate them. The FCC decided,
starting with the Computer I Inquiry—and then followed by the Computer
II and III inquiries—not to regulate these computer-based technologies
under Title II. Rather, they received their own regulatory regime specified
under the Computer Inquiries that exempted them from access charges (the
subsidization scheme that used high long distance rates to lower local
costs). Thus, the Computer Inquiry regulations covered “enhanced
services,” i.e., services with significant computer-based features, while
Title II continued to cover “basic services,” i.e., telephones that consumers
174
used.
For every new computer-based technology that came down the pike,
the FCC had to determine: (1) whether it should be regulated as an
enhanced service or basic service; and (2) if it is an enhanced service, what
types of anti-competitive regulation would be appropriate. The FCC has
produced thousands of orders answering these questions. The FCC
classified and regulated countless technologies—ranging from Centrex
systems, which allow typically large businesses to manage their own
175
internal switching,
to Point-of-Sale Data Processing, which allows
176
merchants to track retail sales,
to various flavors of speed dialing and
177
call forwarding.
One would think that with all this impressive bureaucratic effort a
clear line would emerge between “enhanced services” and “basic services.”
173. Open Internet Proceeding Report and Order, supra note 1. As described in Section
II.B, interconnected VoIP services, which include some over-the-top VoIP services, “are
increasingly being used as a substitute for traditional telephone service.” Id.
174. See generally Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications
Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167 (2003); Reg. and Pol’y
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Comm. Servs. and Facilities,
Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, para. 15, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1713 (1970)
[hereinafter Computer I Tentative Decision].
175. Nynex Tel. Cos. Offer of Comparably Efficient Interconnection to Providers of
Enhanced Servs., Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 2419, para 6 (1996).
176. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs., Final Decision,
77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
177. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 174.
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This could not be further from the truth. The FCC’s definitions constantly
shifted. In the Computer I Inquiry, the FCC defined “communications
service as including ‘message-switching; which in turn includes “the
computer-controlled transmission of messages, between two or more
points, via communications facilities, wherein the content of the message
178
remains unaltered.”
Data processing, on the other hand, involves “the
use of the computer for operations which include, inter alia, the functions
of storing, retrieving, sorting, merging and calculating data, according to
179
programmed instructions.”
From the beginning, this distinction was
unstable and the FCC in Computer I, created hybrid services that were a
little of both, recognizing “[t]he problem is that there is computer
180
processing in both communications and data communications.”
The reason for all this fudging was quite simple. Plain old telephone
service (“POTS”) became more reliant on computer-based technologies.
Voice waves ceased to be transmitted using distinct circuits and became
processed as data. As the decades wore on, the distinction became
increasingly legal and metaphorical and had less and less direct relationship
to technological reality.
Thus, in Computer II, the FCC acknowledged “the inadequacy of the
181
hybrid service definitions in the existing rule.”
It set forth a new
distinction between “basic services” and “enhanced services.” These terms
were defined as follows:
• Basic service is the offering of “a pure transmission capability
over a communications path that is virtually transparent in
terms of its interaction with customer supplied
182
information.”
• Enhanced services are “communications, which employ
computer processing applications that act on the format,
content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber’s
transmitted information . . . provide the subscriber additional,

178. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Services and Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267,
287 (1971).
179. Id.
180. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs., Tentative
Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking, 72 F.C.C.2d 358, para. 86 (1979)
[hereinafter Computer II Notice of Inquiry].
181. Id. at para. 86.
182. See N. Am. Telecomm. Ass’n Petition for Declaratory Ruling Under § 64.702 of
the Commission’s Rules Regarding the Integration of Centrex, Enhanced Servs., and
Customer Premises Equip., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 349, para. 23
(1985) [hereinafter NATA Centrex Order].
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different, or restructured information . . . or involve
183
subscriber interaction with stored information.”
Yet, the FCC continued to have problems with the distinctions. For
example, the FCC classified certain types of “protocol processing” as basic
service, specifically, “communications between a subscriber and the
network itself for call setup, call routing, call cessation, calling or called
184
party identification, billing, and accounting.” This is a problem because
“enhanced services” include “protocol processing.” But, the FCC reasoned,
if this type of processing was considered enhanced, then plain old
telephone services would be enhanced as well. To avoid this result, the
FCC classified as basic services those protocol processing that were
185
somehow intrinsic to basic services.
Beyond relying on vague, categorical distinctions having no real
meaning in technical or engineering terms, the FCC blurred the distinction
further stating that a basic service is present “whether data calls are routed
186
over a circuit switched network or a packet network.” This concession to
technical reality undermined the claim that basic services are “transparent”;
they too are processes. For example, switched virtual circuits (“SVCs”) in
187
connection-oriented packet-switched networks such as X.25,
Frame
188
189
Relay,
and ATM were considered basic services,
even though they
package voice and treat it like data, much as the Internet does. As a final
example of blurring, the FCC in the NATA Centrex Order described
another hybrid regulatory category: “adjunct to basic services” that
facilitate the use of traditional telephone service but do not alter the
183. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 50 n.6 (1980). I am
indebted to the research of Kendell Koning for this analysis of VANS and protocol
processing.
184. Id.
185. Again, I am grateful to Kendall Koning for this insight.
186. Amendment to Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry) and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Phase
II Carrier Service and Facilities Authorizations Thereof Communications Protocols under
Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R.
3072, para. 69 (1987).
187. Amendment to Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry); and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Service and Facilities Authorizations thereof Communications Protocols under
Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Memorandum Opinion and
Order on Reconsideration 3 F.C.C.R. 1150, para. 53 (1988).
188. Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies Offer Of Comparably Efficient Interconnection
To Intranet Management Service Providers, Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 15617, para. 11 (1998).
189. Bell Operating Companies Joint Petition For Waiver Of Computer II Rules, Order,
10 F.C.C.R. 13758, 13773 (1995).
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190

fundamental character of telephone service.
These included voicemail
and automated telephone menu systems that, like enhanced services,
provide the subscriber with “additional, different, or restructured
191
information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.”
Adding to the technical confusion concerning the difference between
enhanced services and basic services, there emerged confusion in legal
terminology. The 1984 MFJ prohibited the Baby Bells from offering
192
“information services.”
It defined this term as “the offering of a
capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing,
retrieving, utilizing or making available information which may be
193
conveyed via telecommunications . . . .” It was using the term to refer to
things such as electronic yellow pages, but later, the FCC began to use the
194
term interchangeably with enhanced services.
The 1996 Act created additional levels of terminological confusion. It
was
primarily
concerned
with
introducing
competition
in
telecommunications markets allowing the Baby Bells to get into longdistance, and overcoming the MFJ’s prohibition. The 1996 Act also aimed
to open the Baby Bells’ local monopolies to competition; it did this by
195
requiring the Baby Bells to open their local networks to competitors.
The Act also introduced new terms, “telecommunications” and
“telecommunications services.” They became the defining terms for the
Act’s scheme of deregulation as the services for which BOCs and LECs
had deregulation and unbundling requirements. These terms were vague:
• “The term ‘telecommunications’ means the transmission,
between or among points specified by the user, of information
of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content
196
of the information as sent and received.”
190. See NATA Centrex Order, supra note 182, at paras. 23–28.
191. Id. at para. 39 (footnote omitted).
192. United States v American Tel. and Tel. Co, 552 F Supp. 131, 226–34 (D.D.C.
1982).
193. Id. at 179.
194. Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1, 23 n.60, 65 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) (1988) (“[T]he antitrust consent
decree which compelled AT & T [sic] to divest the BOCs, originally prohibited the BOCs
from offering any ‘information services,’ a class of services that apparently is similar to
enhanced services.”).
195. Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and The Future of Federalism, 1999
SUPREME COURT REV. 1, 39 (1999) (“In the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Congress
broadly sought to open up local telephone markets to competition by preempting state-law
monopolies over local phone service and requiring incumbent monopolists to facilitate
market entry by granting competitors access to their networks.”).
196. 47 U.S.C. § 153(50) (2006).
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“The term ‘telecommunications service’ means the offering
of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to
such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to
197
the public, regardless of the facilities used.”
The Act also used the term “information services,” which was based on the
198
definition in the MFJ and which had a definition that was quite similar to
the then-used definition for enhanced services. The Act, however, was not
concerned with information services, using the term twenty-one times, as
compared to the hundreds of times it used “telecommunications” or
199
“telecommunications services.”
The FCC used the 1996 Act’s term
200
“information services” interchangeably with “enhanced services.”
In sum, after the 1996 Act, Section 201 continued to regulate common
carriers, which were all bearers of “electronic messages.” Section 251
created deregulatory mandates for “telecommunications services,” which
201
were also regulated under Section 201.
Meanwhile, for decades, FCC
regulation had been creating definitions for “enhanced services” and
“information services,” generally concluding that these terms were the
202
same thing.
Finally, the 1996 Act adopted the FCC’s definition of
“information services,” which is for the most part the same as “enhanced
203
services.” The Act, however, says next to nothing about the term, using
the term twenty times out of its roughly 46,000 words.
Ironically, the Act’s passage preceded, by only a year or so, a tectonic
shift in technology: the emergence of the World Wide Web and the Internet
as a mass phenomenon. Prior to the Act, dial-up Internet service was
regulated as an enhanced information service; the question quickly
emerged was how broadband would be regulated. The FCC had two
choices. It could classify broadband as a telecommunications service and
•

197. Id. § 153(53).
198. Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 104-204(I), pt. 1 at 125 (1995) (“Information service” and
“telecommunications” are defined based on the definitions used in the MFJ).
199. These numbers are our own count.
200. In the Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, the FCC stated that interpreting
“information services” to include all “enhanced services” provides a measure of regulatory
stability for telecommunications carriers and ISPs alike, by preserving the definitional
scheme under which the FCC exempted certain services from Title II regulation.
Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the
Communications Act of 1934, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905, para. 102 (1996) [hereinafter Non-Accounting Safeguards
Order]; see also Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report and Order, 12
F.C.C.R. 8776, para. 788 (1997).
201. See infra Sec. V.
202. See supra notes 192–200 and accompanying text.
203. Id.
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regulate it, or classify it as an information service. If it did the latter, it
could regulate the Internet under Title I, a provision that gives the FCC
“ancillary jurisdiction” over technologies that are related to a regulated
204
technology.
Then under the deregulatory-minded Chairman Michael Power, the
FCC chose to classify broadband as an “information service” regulated
205
under Title I, its “ancillary jurisdiction.”
This section of the Act gives
the FCC the power to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as
206
may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” Because it did not
want to apply the unbundling and interconnection mandates of the 1996
Act, regulating broadband under this jurisdiction seemed appropriate.
There was only one catch: the Act hardly mentions information
services and gives the FCC no direct authority to regulate them. The FCC’s
regulatory role was unclear. Some past precedent had read Title I authority
207
quite expansively, most notably in Southwestern Cable, which allowed
the FCC to regulate cable television as ancillary to over-the-air. Later
precedent was less expansive.
There was also a second catch, and one that has not truly been
recognized: how regulating the Internet as the dominant form of
communication under its ancillary jurisdiction disrupts the structure of
regulating basic service, i.e., the dominant form of communication while
deregulating the extras. The FCC argued that broadband service was
different
from
“telecommunications”
because
it
bundled
telecommunications with information services—presumably transforming
208
the service.
When everyone used telephones as the dominant form of
communication, regulating enhanced services under Title I seemed logical.
But, technologically, things flipped. The Internet became the dominant
form of communication with voice communications literally (as with VoIP)
riding on top of it. If anything, one could logically regulate telephones

204. Aaron K. Brauer-Rieke, The FCC Tackles Net Neutrality: Agency Jurisdiction and
the Comcast Order, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 593, 602 (2009). The FCC has typically relied
on its “ancillary jurisdiction” under Title I of the Act to regulate the Internet. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 159.
205. Brauer-Rieke, supra note 204; see also § 154(i) (This section authorizes the FCC to
“perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not
inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”).
206. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006).
207. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167 (1968).
208. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facils., Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, para. 2
(2002).
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under Title I as ancillary to Title II Internet jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the
FCC’s regulatory scheme remained the same.
Regardless of the FCC’s inconsistencies, the Supreme Court bought
its argument in the famous National Cable Telecommunications
209
Association v. Brand X Internet Services case. By upholding the FCC’s
classification of Internet access as an information service as well as the
FCC’s assertion of Title I jurisdiction, the FCC was free not to impose the
regulatory mandates. It could impose Title I regulations—a possibility that
brought shivers to Justice Scalia in his dissent—but it was unknown if Title
210
I would give adequate authority for any meaningful regulation.
In its reasoning, the FCC relied on the Computer II basic/enhanced
distinction,
claiming
that
it
was
reflected
in
the
211
telecommunications/information services distinction.
This is a bit of a
stretch because, while there is evidence that Congress modeled
“information services” on “enhanced services,” there is no evidence (either
in the text or the legislative history) that basic services were meant to
correspond to telecommunications.
The Court also claimed that telecommunications, like basic services
in Computer II, is transparent, and therefore not a regulated
telecommunications service:
[I]n the Computer II order establishing the terms “basic” and
“enhanced” services, the Commission defined those terms functionally,
based on how the consumer interacts with the provided information . . .
. [T]he transmission occurs only in connection with information
processing. It was therefore consistent with the statute’s terms for the
Commission to assume that the parallel term “telecommunications
service” in § 153(46) likewise describes a “pure” or “transparent”
communications path not necessarily separately present in an
integrated information-processing service from the end user’s
212
perspective.

209. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
210. Id. at 1013 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat the Commission hath given, the
Commission may well take away--unless it doesn't. This is a wonderful illustration of how
an experienced agency can (with some assistance from credulous courts) turn statutory
constraints into bureaucratic discretions . . . . Under its undefined and sparingly used
‘ancillary’ powers, the Commission might conclude that it can order cable companies to
‘unbundle’ the telecommunications component of cable-modem service. And presto, Title II
will then apply to them, because they will finally be ‘offering’ telecommunications service!
. . . Such Möbius-strip reasoning mocks the principle that the statute constrains the agency
in any meaningful way.”).
211. Id. at 993–96.
212. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 970.
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Of course, decades earlier the FCC conceded that “transparency” could not
possibly serve as a distinction between basic and enhanced services, given
213
its classification of packet switching and similar technologies as “basic.”
Thus, Brand X, without acknowledging the great change it allowed
the FCC to make, turned the Act upside down. Neither the Computer
Inquiries nor the Act disrupted an essential regulatory structure that existed
for almost one half a century: the form of dominant communications
remained under regulation, whether that be Section 201 common carriage
or Computer II’s basic service. However, by allowing the FCC to
deregulate the dominant form of communications (via regulation under
Title I)—simply because of technological shift from telephones to the
Internet—the Supreme Court affects a sea change.
It is fair to say that few in 1996 foresaw that Internet communications
would become dominant and replace telephones. Rather, it was assumed
that the FCC would maintain authority over telephones—and any other
dominant “wire communications”—as common carriers. The 1996 Act
would have been far more controversial had its purpose been to remove
federal control over the dominant form of national communication. The
possibility of such a dramatic regulatory retreat does not appear anywhere
in the legislative history.
To reiterate the point using statutory terms, by creating the term
“telecommunications,” the 1996 Act never intended to undo Section 201’s
broad jurisdictional scope. Rather, the term was used to define the scope of
the 1996 Act’s deregulatory regime, i.e., local and long distance
telephones. Similarly, information service was never meant to be some
strange statutory waiting room in which the FCC would place into
regulatory limbo new technologies. But that is what happened.
Of course, the one problem in this regime is that the scope of ancillary
jurisdiction is unclear. As a result, when the FCC chose to regulate on that
basis, as it did when it ordered Comcast to stop its secret disruption of P2P
communications, Comcast successfully appealed. The D.C. Circuit ruled
that the regulation of the Internet exceeded Title I ancillary jurisdiction
because—as was evident since the Brand X decision—it was unclear to
214
what the Internet regulation was ancillary.
213. Id.
214. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 646, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The Court stated
the rule: “‘The Commission . . . may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only when two
conditions are satisfied: (1) the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of
the Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably
ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities.’” Id. at 646 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691–92
(D.C. Cir. 2005)).
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As a final twist in this story, the FCC in the Comcast case relied
(unsuccessfully) upon Section 706. This section gives the FCC authority to
encourage deployment of “advanced services,” a term that the 1996 Act
invented, including information services, and probably was intended to
include the Internet. In the Comcast decision, the Court brushed aside
Section 706 jurisdiction on the grounds that the FCC in a prior order had
stated that Section 706 lacked jurisdictional import.
At last, we have arrived at how the D.C. Circuit will rule on the
jurisdictional challenge in the Open Internet Order. Given the Supreme
215
Court’s recent ruling in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
which
gives the FCC great latitude to change its mind, the D.C. Circuit will have
to rule on whether Section 706 gives the FCC sufficient authority to
regulate the jurisdiction, rather than dismiss on those grounds because the
FCC once determined that they lacked jurisdictional basis.
This is not the place to discuss whether the FCC was correct that
Section 706 does grant jurisdiction and the level of deference its
216
determination should receive. We suspect that whether the Order will be
upheld will depend on whether the D.C. Circuit dismisses the text as
exhortatory, in which case jurisdiction is unlikely to be found.
Yet, what has gone unremarked upon is that the FCC also relied upon
Section 201 in the Open Internet Order. It stated that it had ancillary
authority to its Section 201 authority to regulate over-the-top VoIP
services, which “are increasingly being used as a substitute for traditional
217
telephone service.” This is the Computer Inquiries, indeed the history of
Section 201 jurisdiction, flipped on its head. Once computer-based
communications were ancillary to telephony—now telephony is ancillary
to computer-based communications.
What is amazing about this regulatory transformation is that the
statute never changed. The statutory authority of the FCC never changed
with regard to the Internet and communications in general. No one can
fairly look at the text or legislative history of the 1996 Act and see
Congress’s intent to retreat from regulating the nation’s dominant
communications network. Nothing in the 1996 Act evidences any
congressional judgment that the dominant form of wire communications
should be regulated as a common carrier. Nothing in the 1996 Act
215. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
216. It may very well be wrong. See Daniel A. Lyons, Tethering the Administrative
State: The Case Against Chevron Deference for FCC Jurisdictional Claims, 36 J. CORP. L.
823 (2010); Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron
Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1526–28
(2009).
217. Open Internet Proceeding Report and Order, supra note 1, at para. 125.
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evidences a retreat for the basic structure of regulating basic
communications—and leaving more advanced technologies to the market.
Whether one believes this transformation is a good or a bad thing is an
ideological question about which, given our skepticism voiced earlier in the
Article, we do not believe firm conclusions are possible at this time. But
what is remarkable is that such a radical change could occur without a
direct democratic input. This shift speaks to the power of agencies and
those who influence them, a power that our strange and ambiguous
regulatory statutes magnify.

VI. CONCLUSION
The network neutrality debate has suffered from lawyers playing
economists. Legal scholars and policy wonks have bandied about economic
theories without collecting information about industry organization to make
intelligent conclusions about these theories’ applications. Further, it is not
clear that economic theory is currently in a position to offer any clear
policy guidelines. Even more fundamentally, the debate, as well as the FCC
Open Internet Proceeding, has suffered from an uncritical use of the term
“discrimination.” It is a concept with which lawyers are quite familiar, and
it has an established meaning in circuit-switched telephone networks
referring to an “equality of treatment” at switch points. We show, however,
that discrimination in Internet networks is far more complex, involving a
type of “equality of outcomes.” In the Internet, there is no necessary
relationship between equality of treatment in Internet traffic and equality of
outcomes—at least outcomes people care about. Finally, actual Internet
controversies, such as BitTorrent, implicate issues beyond Internet traffic
protocol. Our suggestion responds to the unsettled industrial theory and the
heightened normative concerns with a solution of law. The FCC should
pursue case-by-case adjudication. This adaptive approach lets principles
emerge from practice, and thus grows doctrines of law for the open
Internet.

